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THE DUTIES OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR 
TO ITS CREDITORS 
Robert Charles Clark * 
Fraudulent conveyance law, equitable subordination doctrine, 
dividend restraint statutes, and piercing the corporate veil tradi- 
tionally have been viewed as separate legal theories. Starting with 
an analysis of the ideals behind fraudulent conveyance law, Professor 
Clark develops the interrelations between these doctrines and explains 
their existence as distinct bodies of law. 
INTRODUCTION 
T HE initial thesis of this article is that the law of fraudulent 
conveyances 1 contains a few simple but potent moral prin- 
ciples governing the conduct of debtors toward their creditors. 
Moreover, when these normative ideals are properly distilled and 
examined, a number of less venerable doctrines concerning cor- 
porate debtors can be shown to be functional substitutes for or 
technically necessary complements to the law of fraudulent con- 
veyances. In particular, the doctrines of equitable subordination 
and piercing the corporate veil may be seen as applications of 
the same notions of securing the moral obligations of debtors to 
creditors which are at work in fraudulent conveyance law. 
The near absence of sustained discussion in cases or in the 
writings of commentators of the relationships among these 
branches of the law is odd, in view of the importance that these 
doctrines have to attorneys.2 My explanation is that the lack of 
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B. Maryknoll Seminary (Ill.), 
I966; Ph.D. Columbia, 1971; J.D. Harvard, I972. 
1 A succinct and general expression of fraudulent conveyance law appears in the 
INSTITUTES 4.6.6. A more recent expression was given by the statute of 13 Eliz., ch. 
5 (I57I). Modern statements include the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT 
[hereinafter UFCA], which has been adopted by about half of the states, and the 
Bankruptcy Act's own fraudulent conveyance statute, ? 67d, II U.S.C. ? I07(d) 
(I970). Important commentary and discussion of case law is provided by V. 
COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 127-79 (2d ed. 1974) 
(notes); 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940); 
4 J. MOORE ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY TII 67.29-67.43 (I4th ed. I975); Mc- 
Laughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REV. 
404 (i933). 
2 Veil-piercing cases and equitable subordination are often treated together in 
courses on corporate law, and commentators have analyzed some of the interrela- 
tionships between these two doctrines. See generally the dialogue between Profes- 
sors Landers and Posner: Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and 
Afiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (I975) [hereinafter cited 
as Landers I]; Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Afiliated Corporations, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976); Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affili- 
ates in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (I976) [hereinafter cited as Landers II]. 
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comparative analysis has performed a practical function. Since 
equitable subordination and piercing the corporate veil are, in 
large part, modes of overcoming the extraneous limitations of 
historically received fraudulent conveyance law, the judges who 
have initiated and developed these doctrines probably moved 
instinctively to portray them as applications of a respected tradi- 
tion of equitable principles and rhetoric, rather than as a weaken- 
ing of the ancient and substantial body of law of fraudulent 
conveyances.3 
The first section of the article will attempt to isolate the 
distinct but related purposes of fraudulent conveyance law- 
a task sorely neglected in literally hundreds of cases applying 
that body of law.4 In light of these principles, the second section 
initially will focus on showing equitable subordination to be a 
functional substitute for fraudulent conveyance law under certain 
restrictive conditions. Then, by analyzing the legal system's 
response to situations that occur without one or more of these 
restrictions, I will uncover the origins and distinctive functions 
of the doctrine of equitable subordination.5 The third section 
will compare how the proposal of the Commission on the Bank- 
ruptcy Laws of the United States concerning the subordination 
of insider creditors' claims implements these principles.6 The 
fourth section shows the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil 
as expanding the ideals of equitable subordination and of fraud- 
ulent conveyance law.7 Finally, in the fifth section, common 
statutory restrictions on dividends are exposed as a weakened 
means of implementing the goals of fraudulent conveyance law.8 
I. THE NORMATIVE IDEALS OF FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCE LAW 
The law of fraudulent conveyances, of which the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) 9 is the principal but not 
But sustained analysis of the relationship of these two doctrines to fraudulent con- 
veyance law is rare indeed. 
3 Note that this hypothesis does not require a belief that the judges who, for 
example, developed equitable subordination were consciously suppressing the 
doctrine's relationship to fraudulent conveyance law. 
4 See pp. 506-I7. 
5See pp. 517-36. 
6 See pp. 536-40. 
7 See pp. 540-53. 
8 See pp. 554-60. 
9 Because the UFCA is frequently cited in this article, it is here set forth in full: 
Sec. i. Definition of Terms. In this act "Assets" of a debtor means prop- 
erty not exempt from liability for his debts. To the extent that any property 
is liable for any debts of the debtor, such property shall be included in his 
assets. 
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exclusive embodiment, allows creditors to set aside certain trans- 
fers by debtors. Fraudulent conveyance law has a broad ap- 
"Conveyance" includes every payment of money, assignment, release, trans- 
fer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also 
the creation of any lien or incumbrance. 
"Creditor" is a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, 
liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent. 
"Debt" includes any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured, 
liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent. 
Sec. 2. Insolvency. (i) A person is insolvent when the present fair salable 
value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay his 
probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured. 
(2) In determining whether a partnership is insolvent there shall be added 
to the partnership property the present fair salable value of the separate 
assets of each general partner in excess of the amount probably sufficient to 
meet the claims of his separate creditors, and also the amount of any unpaid 
subscription to the partnership of each limited partner, provided the present 
fair salable value of the assets of such limited partner is probably sufficient 
to pay his debts including such unpaid subscription. 
Sec. 3. Fair Consideration. Fair consideration is given for property, or 
obligation, 
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent 
therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is 
satisfied, or 
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure 
a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small 
as compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained. 
Sec. 4. Conveyances by Insolvent. Every conveyance made and every 
obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent 
is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the con- 
veyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration. 
Sec. 5. Conveyances by Persons in Business. Every conveyance made 
without fair consideration when the person making it is engaged or is about 
to engage in a business or transaction for which the property remaining in 
his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent 
as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the con- 
tinuance of such business or transaction without regard to his actual intent. 
Sec. 6. Conveyances by a Person About to Incur Debts. Every con- 
veyance made and every obligation incurred without fair consideration when 
the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or 
believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is 
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
Sec. 7. Conveyance Made With Intent to Defraud. Every conveyance 
made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from 
intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future 
creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
Sec. 8. Conveyance of Partnership Property. Every conveyance of part- 
nership property and every partnership obligation incurred when the partner- 
ship is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to partnership 
creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred. 
(a) To a partner, whether with or without a promise by him to pay part- 
nership debts, or 
(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to the partner- 
ship as distinguished from consideration to the individual partners. 
Sec. 9. Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Matured. (i) Where a 
conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when 
his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for 
fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, 
or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser, 
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent 
necessary to satisfy his claim, or 
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the 
property conveyed. 
(2) A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than 
a fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation, may retain the property 
or obligation as security for repayment. 
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plicability, restricted neither to conveyances - since virtually 
all transfers of property, and, under the UFCA and under the 
Bankruptcy Act, the incurrence of obligations, are covered 10- 
nor to fraud - since unfair transfers made without deceptive 
intent 1 are included. Court opinions involving allegedly fraud- 
ulent transfers have not infrequently sounded muddled and un- 
certain notes because of a failure to discriminate among the 
various distinct ideals that this body of law seeks to implement. 
Although more than one of these distinct ideals are usually 
involved in actual cases, what these ideals are, and how closely 
they are related to the ideal underlying the law of preferential 
transfers, can be seen through an examination of four simple 
situations. 
i. Debtor grants Friend a mortgage on his small factory in 
return for a loan of $160,000, which Friend actually makes to 
Debtor. Debtor, wishing to discourage unpaid trade creditors 
having $30,000 of claims from litigating them to judgment and 
seeking execution against the factory, prevails upon Friend to 
have the recorded mortgate recite that it secures a debt for 
$200,000, which equals the well-known market value of the 
factory.12 The trade creditors' attorneys search the real estate 
records, discover and give credence to the false mortgage, and, 
Sec. io. Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Not Matured. Where 
a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor whose 
claim has not matured he may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction 
against any person against whom he could have proceeded had his claim ma- 
tured, and the court may, 
(a) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property, 
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property, 
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or 
(d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require. 
Sec. II. Cases Not Provided for in Act. In any case not provided for in 
this Act the rules of law and equity including the law merchant, and in 
particular the rules relating to the law of principal and agent, and the effect 
of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy or other 
invalidating cause shall govern. 
Sec. 12. Construction of Act. This act shall be so interpreted and con- 
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those 
states which enact it. 
Sec. I3. Name of Act. This act may be cited as the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act. 
Sec. 14. Inconsistent Legislation Repealed. Sections . . . are hereby re- 
pealed, and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby 
repealed. 
'1UFCA ?? I, 4, 6, 7; Bankruptcy Act ?? 1(30), 67d(2)-(4), II U.S.C. ?? 
1(30), Io7(d) (2)-(4) (I970). 
"See, e.g., UFCA ? 4; Bankruptcy Act ? 67d(2)(a), II U.S.C. ? I07(d)(2)(a) 
(I970). 
12 In order to protect himself from possible double-crossing on the part of 
Friend, Debtor has Friend sign a secret affidavit stating that as of the date after 
the recording he is owed only $160,000 by Debtor, and the promissory note given 
by Debtor is in only this amount. Given the affidavit and the note, Friend's 
recovery would be limited to the $160,000 in any legal action. 
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knowing that Debtor has few assets other than the factory, be- 
come discouraged and cease pursuing Debtor. 
Here, then, is a case of Ur-Fraud, that primeval fraud on 
creditors than which no greater can be thought. The transfer of 
the mortgage interest to Friend was known to be false, was 
intended to thwart legitimate creditors, and actually did so. The 
keynote of the evil is the actual deception or falsehood practiced 
on the trade creditors to their detriment. By hypothesis, Friend 
gave full and fair consideration for the extent of the mortgage 
interest that he could enforce against Debtor. Further, the 
mortgage interest that he obtained did not actually render 
Debtor incapable of satisfying the remaining creditors. The ideal 
offended is simply that of Truth: in connection with transfers of 
property rights to others, a debtor is forbidden to tell lies to his 
creditors that will lead to the nonsatisfaction of their claims.13 
2. Debtor has reached the point where $100,000 of her debts 
are due and payable, and her entire assets have a fair market 
value of the same dollar amount. Thinking that she would prefer 
that her husband and sister rather than her creditors get the 
benefits of her assets, she makes a deed of gift of all her posses- 
sions to those two fortunate relatives, and immediately delivers 
full and exclusive actual possession of the property to them, 
relinquishing any use or benefit from the transferred property. 
She makes no secret of the transaction or of her intentions: she 
reports the deed of gift in every conceivable recording office, and 
mails a copy by certified mail to each and every creditor, together 
with a detailed and psychologically accurate account of her 
motivations, purposes, and feelings toward her creditors. In 
this case, Debtor has made a transfer which would clearly be 
13 Finding fraudulent conveyance cases as to which we can be sure enough of the 
real facts to say that untruthful conduct and nothing else constituted the violation 
of duty to creditors is difficult. However, there are many cases under UFCA ? 7 
and similar rules in which the court decides on the basis of actual intent to defraud 
creditors in the sense of deceiving them, and notes that proof of facts violating 
other ideals is therefore unnecessary. See, e.g., Linder v. Lewis, Roca, Scoville & 
Beauchamp, 85 Ariz. II8, 333 P.2d 286 (1958) (transferee misrepresented himself 
as purchaser for value; transferor's insolvency need not be proved); Cooper v. 
Cooper, I68 Cal. App. 2d 326, 335 P.2d 9,83 (1959) (putting title in name of woman 
friend to conceal ownership from former wife-creditor fraudulent; immaterial 
whether debtor rendered insolvent); Brown Packing Co. v. Lewis, 185 Misc. 
445, 58 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1943) (fair and adequate consideration irrelevant where 
there is no actual intent to defraud); Sheffit v. Koff, I75 Pa. Super. 37, ioo A.2d 
393 (I953) (showing of insolvency and lack of fair consideration not necessary 
under ? 7). 
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voidable since it was made without fair and full consideration 14 
and she was insolvent immediately after the transfer.l5 
The ideal offended by Debtor in the above example is not 
that of truthful conduct toward creditors. Debtor has been com- 
pletely open with her creditors and has never tried to deceive 
them, unless one wants to overstretch the notion of fraud by 
saying that, when she originally borrowed from her creditors, 
she "implicitly" promised to satisfy her legal obligations before 
her moral obligations and personal allegiances, that she has now 
failed to fulfill this promise, and that the failure is conclusive 
evidence that the promise was falsely and deceptively given. 
Instead, it is much simpler, and intellectually more honest, to 
recognize that another ideal is served by fraudulent conveyance 
law. The ideal can be captured by a cliche: be just before you 
are generous.16 The debtor has a moral duty 17 in transferring 
his property to give primacy to so-called legal obligations, which 
are usually the legitimate, conventional claims of standard con- 
14 See UFCA ? 3 (definition of consideration). 
5 See UFCA ? 4. 
The same provision would be used to undo certain related types of trans- 
actions, such as a sale of her property while debtor is insolvent to relatives or to 
innocent nonrelated parties at less than the property's fair equivalent value, 
whether the sale was deliberately designed to satisfy moral obligations or perceived 
allegiances to or preferences for the transferees or was simply a bad bargain on the 
transferor's part, resulting from ignorance and incompetence. In the absence of 
preemptive statutes concerning the legality of dividends, this same provision, or 
the one concerning transfers without fair consideration which leave a business with 
"unreasonably small capital," see UFCA ? 5, would also vitiate dividends paid to 
shareholders on the eve of a corporation's insolvency, as well as a myriad host of 
bargain transactions with corporate insiders - excessive salaries, purchases and sales 
at prices that are bargains to the insider, phony loans, and so forth. 
16 More specifically, this statement can be unpacked into a small family of 
commandments: Always act so that you can fulfill your legal obligations after 
any of the following: i) transferring property to satisfy moral obligations and per- 
sonal allegiances; 2) making inadvertent or coerced transfers for less than full 
value; and 3) retaining property for your personal benefit or, in the corporate 
context, transferring it to your shareholders. Considerations of human dignity, as 
evidenced by the exemptions available in bankruptcy proceedings, now obviously 
limit the third commandment. 
17 I describe the duties inherent in fraudulent conveyance law as "moral" for 
at least two reasons. First, they are standards of right and wrong in debtor- 
creditor relationships, both commercial and personal, that have endured over many 
centuries and have governed extremely common transactions. The relation between 
debtors and creditors is as old as civilization, is only slightly less significant than 
relationships among family members, social classes, and races, has always occupied 
a substantial portion of the resources of legal systems, and has always been regu- 
lated in the commercial context by attitudes and emotions of a decidedly moral 
sort. Second, these duties are, I think, not really perceived as imposed by the 
statutes and cases which reflect them--as are many modern legal obligations- 
but are perceived to be a part of normative custom. 
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tract and tort creditors, as opposed to the interests of self, family, 
friends, shareholders, and shrewder or more powerful bargaining 
parties.18 I will somewhat hesitantly refer to this as the normative 
ideal of Respect.'9 
3. Pierce is indebted to Twyne for $400 and to C for $200. 
Pierce's nonexempt assets are worth only $300. Suppose that 
Pierce, simply because Twyne is the first to ask that he do so 
and because he dislikes C, and for no other reason, transfers all 
of his property to Twyne. Suppose, contrary to the apparent facts 
in a similar, well-known case,20 that Pierce makes the transfer 
openly and with much publicity and fanfare, so that no deception 
of any sort is practiced on C, and that Pierce does not intend 
to and never does get a kickback of part of the transferred 
property or its use or any other kind of benefit from Twyne. 
Assume also that Twyne's claim is a completely valid, unobjec- 
tionable, due and payable, legal obligation of the most conven- 
tional sort. 
Pierce's transfer to Twyne does not run afoul of the normative 
ideals of Truth and Respect toward creditors because Pierce has 
fully and truthfully described the transaction and has given 
primacy to his legal obligations. It is, however, objectionable 
for a debtor to satisfy the claims of just one creditor at a time 
when he lacks sufficient assets to meet his other legitimate and 
conventional legal obligations. A preferential payment of this 
sort hinders pro tanto the interest of all the other creditors. 
In such a situation, a debtor should deal equally with all his 
creditors. I will dub this principle the ideal of Evenhandedness 
toward creditors, with the understanding that in using this term 
the connotation is of equality of treatment of legal obligations 
8 Fraudulent conveyances of the sort under discussion may be buried amid 
obscuring factors, and it thus requires judicial imagination to see through the 
disguises and lawyerly caution to anticipate the possibilities. For instance, a boot- 
strap acquisition plan may give rise to voidable fraudulent conveyances when the 
acquired company later distributes assets, either directly to the seller or to the 
stock purchaser for use in meeting obligations to the seller, when the company is 
insolvent or possessed of small capital. E.g., Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526 
(E.D. Okla.), aff'd., 389 F.2d 233 (Ioth Cir. 1968) (A sold stock in corporation 
X to B, taking note for most of purchase price; parties have X discharge B's 
obligation by furnishing free materials to A.) 
9 Were the connotations not so challengingly disturbing, I would label this 
ideal the principle of fealty to creditors, since the term "fealty" describes the sort 
of primary allegiance that is apparently called for by the law. Another possible 
label, "loyalty," has been preempted for use in the quite parallel context of a 
corporate director's duty to his corporation: the director must avoid abusive 
self-dealing and other conduct which puts his own interests, or that of a par- 
ticular group of shareholders, above the interests of the shareholders as a whole. 
20Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 8ob, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber I6oi). 
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in connection with liquidation proceedings.21 Evenhandedness, 
in its fullest expression, has two aspects. Whenever a debtor is 
or is about to become insolvent and thus unable to satisfy all 
his creditors in full, the debtor should refrain from preferring 
one creditor over another. Similarly, in such cases creditors 
should refrain from seeking such a preference. In either instance, 
transfers resulting in better than equal treatment on the eve of 
liquidation proceedings should be undone -and may actually 
be undone in bankruptcy proceedings as voidable preferential 
transfers. 
4. Debtor, who owns 250 shares of stock, sold those shares 
to her husband for full value in illiquid assets. She was not in- 
solvent at the time of the sale but the stock had been her only 
liquid asset and as a result of the transaction she had no assets 
which creditors could easily reach. She made the transfer for 
the purpose of hindering her creditors but did not deceive them. 
This transaction would be avoided under the open-ended language 
of the UFCA,22 which covers transactions made with actual intent 
to hinder or delay creditors.23 
Although the debtor intends and accomplishes a transfer 
leading to a hindering of her creditors, this case does not strictly 
offend the ideals of Truth, Respect or Evenhandedness as de- 
veloped above. The scheme involves no actual deception, for 
she has truthfully informed all her creditors of the transaction. 
Moreover, the transfer of the shares is not for less than their 
fair value, nor does the transfer leave the debtor insolvent, so 
the transfer does not violate the ideal of Respect. Finally, the 
scheme results in no preference of any preexisting creditor over 
the others. Hence, one could say that there may be transactions 
which are not offensive of the above ideals in their normal ap- 
plications, but which are yet fraudulent conveyances because 
they violate the more general expression of the ideal of which 
all three of the subsumed ideals are specifications. The general 
ideal might be described as that of Nonhindrance of the enforce- 
21 The ideal of Evenhandedness is not always adopted, especially in piecemeal 
liquidations, when individual creditors separately levy upon and exhaust the debt- 
or's property, as opposed to collective liquidations such as dissolution and wind- 
ing up under state corporate law, straight bankruptcy proceedings under federal 
law, liquidating receiverships, and assignments for the benefit of creditors. The ideal 
is, however, sometimes enforced, as among creditors of the same class, in pro- 
ceedings looking toward reorganization rather than liquidation of the distressed 
debtor -for instance, in reorganizations under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 
II U.S.C. ?? 101-276 (1970). 
22 See UFCA ? 7. 
23This hypothetical is based on the facts in Klein v. Rossi, 25I F. Supp. i 
(E.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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ment of valid legal obligations against oneself, in connection with 
transfers of one's property. 
In summary, then, fraudulent conveyance law embodies a 
general ideal, in connection with a debtor's transfers of property 
rights and incurrences of new obligations, of Nonhindrance of 
creditors. This vague ideal is made operational through the 
effectuation of the more specific ideals of Truth, Respect, and 
Evenhandedness as well as a general, residual prohibition of 
conduct which hinders creditors in attempting to satisfy their 
claims. 
Thus far, Evenhandedness has been conceived of as one of 
three particular duties derived from the general duty of Non- 
hindrance, because a violation of the duty of Evenhandedness 
operates to hinder the nonpreferred creditors. It is also possible, 
however, to view Evenhandedness as a policy independent of, 
and on a par with, a general ideal of Nonhindrance, and this 
aspect of the policy has led to its development as a separate topic. 
While like the other two ideals Evenhandedness specifies the 
moral duties of a debtor to his creditor, Evenhandedness is also 
the ideal behind what is referred to as the law of voidable 
preferences and many cases assume or state explicitly that a 
preference is not a fraudulent conveyance.24 However, the fact 
situations in many fraudulent conveyance cases suggest that 
those cases might have been treated equally as well as instances 
of voidable preferences.25 
For example, one of the great ironies of legal history is that 
Twyne's Case,26 which is widely regarded as the fountainhead of 
the modern Anglo-American law of fraudulent conveyances,27 
does not, as presented in the reports, clearly involve anything 
more than a preference. The transaction offended the ideal of 
Evenhandedness, which was not then an ideal that the common 
law of individual collection efforts respected, but it is not clear 
that it offended the ideals of Truth and Respect in any relevant 
way. The facts, which are roughly similar to those in the third 
example discussed above, do appear to include the circumstance 
that Pierce's transfer to Twyne was secret. But why a transac- 
tion which would be a mere nonvolidable preference if done 
openly should become a voidable fraudulent conveyance because 
done secretly is not at all clear, either from the report of the case 
24 E.g., Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (I9I7); Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242 
(1909); Pope v. National Aero Fin. Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 
(I965); Johnson v. O'Brien, 275 Minn. 28, 144 N.W.2d 720 (I966). 
25 See, e.g., Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d II (7th Cir. I972). 
263 Coke 8ob, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber I60I). 
27 See C. CORMAN, COMMERCIAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS I87 (1976). 
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or in logic.28 Perhaps the secrecy led C to pursue his collection 
efforts longer than he would have had he known of the preference, 
and thus to waste money. This possibility, it seems, could have 
been covered quite adequately by letting C recover the pointless 
expenses, rather than condemning the whole transfer to Twyne 
as a criminal act. It might conceivably be that the key to the 
case was that Pierce was satisfying some moral obligation to 
Twyne, for the report is full of apparently irrelevant remarks 
concerning that theme.29 More likely, and supported by in- 
ferences from the report,30 is the hypothesis that Pierce violated 
the ideal of Truth because he did not really transfer the entire 
amount of his property, but under a kickback arrangement with 
Twyne (who was apparently too slow of foot at that point to 
win his race against C via the use of judicial process) kept the 
use and benefit of certain property. Pierce was to keep some of 
his assets, though insolvent; Twyne was to obtain a larger per- 
centage of his claim than if he resorted to legitimate collection 
procedures; and both were to defraud C in his collection efforts 
by pretending that Pierce no longer had any assets. The case 
may actually be understandable, then, as a case similar to the 
first example above, which involved actual, detrimental decep- 
tion.31 
Despite their essential kinship, the fact that fraudulent con- 
veyances and voidable preferences have emerged as distinct legal 
28 For an interesting but unsuccessful attempt to argue that it may be a 
fraudulent conveyance to attempt to conceal a preference, see In re Cushman 
Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 30-34 (ist Cir. I975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3586 (April 
20, 1976). 
29 76 Eng. Rep. at 814-I5, 822-23. 
30"[N]otwithstanding that [the deed of gift of all Pierce's goods and chattels 
to Twyne, in satisfaction of his debt] Pierce continued in possession of the said 
goods, and some of them he sold; and he shore the sheep, and marked them with 
his own mark ... ." 76 Eng. Rep. at 8II. "The donor continued in possession, and 
used them as his own; and by reason thereof he traded and trafficked with others, 
and defrauded and deceived them." 76 Eng. Rep. at 812-13. "[N]otwithstanding 
here was a true debt due to Twyne, and a good consideration of the gift, yet it 
was not within the proviso of the said Act of 13 Eliz.... it is not bona fide, for 
no gift shall be deemed to be bona fide within the said proviso which is accom- 
panied with any trust . . . [and] continuance of the possession in the donor, is a sign 
of trust." 76 Eng. Rep. at 8I4. 
Twyne's case is, of course, the fountainhead of doctrines of fraudulent reten- 
tion of possession, the ultimate development of which was to plague the develop- 
ment of the law governing security interests in personal property left in the 
debtor's possession. Indeed, a good number of the fraudulent conveyance cases 
decided under the "actual fraud" rubric involve transfers of property without a 
change of possession. See 2 G. GLENN, supra note I, chs. XVIII(B)-XX (rev. 
ed. 1940). 
31 76 Eng. Rep. at 823. 
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doctrines has significant consequences. While both fraudulent 
conveyances and preferences are voidable in bankruptcy,32 
preferences can be avoided only by the bankruptcy trustee while 
fraudulent conveyances are voidable under state law at the behest 
of individual creditors.33 Similarly, whereas preferences must 
have occurred within four months before the filing of the bank- 
ruptcy petition in order to be voidable,34 fraudulent conveyances 
which took place one year or possibly more before filing 35 may 
be set aside. And the lists of technical requirements concerning 
the two branches of law could be differentiated at point after 
point.36 
Perhaps the key to the existence of the two great, "separate" 
branches of the law concerning the debtor's moral duties to his 
creditors is that the ideal of Evenhandedness has never been 
considered as important to the functioning of the commercial 
system, which constitutes the essence of our culture, as the ideals 
of Truth and Respect. Evenhandedness, therefore, has been 
relegated in part to a separate doctrinal category, where it can 
be diluted and adjusted by limited implementing rules, without 
32 See Bankruptcy Act ?? 60, 67d, 7oe, II U.S.C. ?? 96, Io7(d), IIo(e) (1970). 
33 Indeed, in the area of piecemeal liquidation of insolvent estates, state law 
not only allows debtors to give creditors preferred treatment but permits creditors 
to seek to obtain it forcibly, by selfconsciously rejecting the principle of equal 
treatment in favor of the "grab" principle: the guiding notion is that diligence 
in the use of individual coercive collective procedures should be rewarded, so that 
the swiftest of wing- he who, or it which, first gets a judicial lien - should be first 
satisfied. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. ? 3432 (I970). 
34See Bankruptcy Act ? 6oa(i), II U.S.C. ? 96(a)(I) (1970) (definition of 
preference). Exceptions may occur when the trustee, relying on ? 7oe, invokes state 
law to avoid a preference. See 4A J. MOORE T AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ? 70.88 
(i4th ed. I975). 
35 Most transfers and obligations voidable under ?67d, II U.S.C. ?IO7(d) 
(I970), must have occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy peti- 
tion. See ? 67d(2), (4), II U.S.C. ? Io7(d)(2), (4) (I970). But see ? 67d(3), II 
U.S.C. ? Io7(d) (3) (I970). Transfers and obligations avoided by a trustee in bank- 
ruptcy under ? 7oe, II U.S.C. ? IIo(e) (1970) may have occurred much further in 
the past, depending on the applicable state statute of limitation. See 4A J. MOORE 
ET AL., supra note 34, ? 70.7I at 8o0. 
36 An antecedent debt equal to the value of the transferred property can be 
fair consideration for fraudulent conveyance purposes; a transfer can be a preference 
only when it is given for or on account of an antecedent debt. A fraudulent con- 
veyance may be voidable, at least in part, despite the transferee's complete good 
faith; a preference is voidable under ? 6ob only if the preferee had, at the time of 
the transfer, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. Transfers may 
sometimes be voidable fraudulent conveyances even when the transferor is not 
afterwards insolvent; a preference can only be made by an insolvent debtor. Dif- 
erent definitions of "insolvency" govern the two contexts. Fraudulent conveyance 
rules apply to transfers made and obligations incurred; preference rules obviously 
apply only to transfers. 
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affecting the other two ideals. This strategy is reflected in such 
tired, and not entirely accurate or meaningful, saws as the one 
that there is nothing morally or legally "wrong" with giving or 
seeking a preference, though fraudulent conveyances should not 
be counselled by the debtor's or the creditors' attorneys.37 It is 
also reflected, of course, in the enormous number of exceptions 
made to the principle of equal treatment of creditors in bank- 
ruptcy-exceptions ranging from security interests through 
statutory priorities to contractual and other forms of subordina- 
tion among creditors.38 
The ideals of Nonhindrance, including the special evolution 
of Evenhandedness in the voidable preference doctrine, have 
been presented above in a rather tidy and purified form. In 
actual implementation, the ideals are often balanced against other 
objectives of the legal system, especially that of fairness toward 
the debtor's transferee. As is evident from a close reading of 
the UFCA, the good faith or absence of actual fraudulent intent 
of the transferee may have a bearing on the extent of the creditor's 
recovery.39 Though it does not seem unduly harsh to ask an 
innocent transferee to disgorge the amount by which he has 
beat the market when he paid less than fair value for transferred 
property, given that the transferor's innocent creditors would 
otherwise lose that amount, to go further would be punitive and 
unfair. Moreover, in some old or odd cases the transferee's in- 
nocence may prevent recovery entirely, and under dividend 
statutes,40 the transferee's status as innocent public shareholder 
may protect him entirely. Furthermore, in actions to avoid 
preference under Bankruptcy Act section 60b, the preferee must 
be shown to have had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor 
was insolvent at the time of the transfer.41 
In addition, the legal system, in implementing the ideals of 
Nonhindrance, has had to go beyond the fraudulent conveyance 
doctrine, embedding Nonhindrance principles in other branches 
37 As the Supreme Court put it, "The Statute recognizes the difference between 
the intent to defraud and the intent to prefer, and also the difference between a 
fraudulent and a preferential conveyance. One is inherently and always vicious; 
the other innocent and valid, except when made in violation of the express provi- 
sions of a statute. One is malum per se and the other malum prohibitum,--and 
then only to the extent that it is forbidden." Van Iderstine v. National Discount 
Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (I9I3). 
38 See generally 3A J. MOORE ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 64.0I-64.70I 
(I4th ed. 1975). 
39See UFCA ?? 3, 9(2). 
40 See pp. 554-60 infra. 
41 However, in another context involving Evenhandedness--a proceeding to 
declare a judicial lien invalid under the Bankruptcy Act ? 67a - this is not a pre- 
requisite. 
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of the law. In theory, the norms of Nonhindrance could be 
effectuated through three radically different modes. First, the 
ideals could be expressed as a system of transactional rules; 
decision of cases under the rules would necessitate examination 
of specific transactions and proof of a violation of an ideal in 
each transaction. Fraudulent conveyance law fits this mode. 
The second mode of implementation is the gestalt approach: 
when transactions are complex or involve elements that are not 
normally covered under the transactional mode, this approach 
would permit a court to apply a remedy, albeit a crude one, to 
correct a pattern of fraudulent transfers or obligations that may 
reasonably be inferred. This mode of implementation is, it will 
be argued in Part II, exemplified by the doctrine of equitable 
subordination. Finally, the ideals could be embodied in a system 
of preventive rules. It is urged that the rule of automatic sub- 
ordination proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission and dis- 
cussed in Part III below is an instance of this third mode of 
implementation. Thus, the next two parts focus on the relation- 
ships between these three modes of implementation of the ideals 
of Nonhindrance. 
II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND 
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION 
Compared to the law of fraudulent conveyances, the doctrine 
of equitable subordination is more modern, less widely adopted 
by legal systems and basically applicable to a much narrower 
class of situations - federal bankruptcy proceedings involving 
debtors owned or controlled by persons who are also creditors of 
the bankrupt.42 Typically, application of the doctrine of equitable 
subordination leads to the result that the creditor claims of an 
insider or controlling party - a parent corporation, a sole share- 
holder, or a shareholder who in relation to other shareholders 
owns "debt" claims against the insolvent corporation in the same 
42A leading article on equitable subordination is Herzog and Zweibel, The 
Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, I5 VAND. L. REV. 83 (I96I). 
See also Ashe, Subordination of Claims, 84 BANKING L.J. 778 (I967); Gleick, 
Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy Under the Equitable Power of the Bank- 
ruptcy Court, I6 Bus. LAW. 611 (I96I); Kennedy, Insolvency and the Corporate 
Veil in the United States, in CANADIAN AND FOREIGN LAW RESEARCH CENTRE: PRO- 
CEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMPARATIVE LAW 233 
(I971); Riemer, Claims Against Bankrupt Corporations Based on Advances by 
Controlling Shareholders or Parent Corporations, 73 COM. L.J. 273 (I968); Note, 
Parent Corporation's Claims in Bankruptcy of Subsidiary: Effect of Fiduciary 
Relationship, 54 HARV. L. REV. I045 (I941). The standard reference work's treat- 
ment appears in 3 J. MOORE ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1T 57.I4 (I4th ed. rev. 
I976) and 3A J. MOORE ET AL., supra note 38, ~I[ 63.06, 63.08, 65.o6. 
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proportion as his stock ownership - are subordinated to those of 
bona fide outside creditors. The subordination is not automatic 
in our present law but is said to turn on the presence of fraudulent 
conduct by the insiders, mismanagement of the insolvent corpora- 
tion, or inadequate capitalization of the corporation.43 
In this part, first the functional equivalence between fraud- 
ulent conveyance law and equitable subordination doctrine in 
implementing the normative principles previously discussed will 
be illustrated by dealing with a large class consisting of fraud 
cases and most of the so-called mismanagement cases. After 
discussing why the development of equitable subordination was 
necessary, a small number of mismanagement cases, which might 
be described as "pure waste" cases not involving fraudulent 
transfers of any sort, will then be isolated. My comments will 
attempt to show that equitable subordination serves a function 
with respect to these situations that complements that served 
with respect to the first category of fraud and mismanagement 
cases. The inadequate capitalization cases will receive special 
consideration. 
A. The Area of Functional Equivalence 
Between Fraudulent Conveyance Law and 
Equitable Subordination Doctrine 
Analysis of a few examples will show that, given three re- 
strictive conditions, equitable subordination is principally a func- 
tional substitute for fraudulent conveyance law.44 These conditions 
are: (a) a simple situation, which is here defined as one involving 
only one tainted transaction by the bankrupt corporation at the 
instance of controlling parties; (b) a world in which corrective 
legal responses to tainted transactions take place without transac- 
tion costs; 45 and (c) a policy decision that any rule attempting 
43 Herzog and Zweibel classify the subordination cases into six categories. See 
Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 42, at 90-II2. With a few exceptions, the cases under 
three of their headings (fraud, fiduciary relationship, and instrumentality and alter 
ego cases) appear upon analysis of their facts to suggest actual or constructive fraud. 
See pp. 526-27 & notes 54 and 63 infra. One of their categories, the capital contribu- 
tion cases, explicitly implicates the inadequate capitalization issue. Their other two 
categories are of tangential interest only. The "consensual subordination" cases 
simply involve courts in the process of finding or inferring an intent by a creditor 
to subordinate his claim to those of others -such cases are not within the ambit 
of "equitable subordination" as I construe the term. Finally, the remaining cases 
concern claims tainted by illegality. 
44 In fact, under these restrictive conditions, equitable subordinations may oc- 
casionally serve as a functional substitute for a few other legal doctrines, such 
as that which permits a derivative suit against corporate directors and officers for 
waste of corporate assets. 
45 Transaction costs, and in particular the expenses of administering the bank- 
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to undo the effects of a controlling creditor's influence should 
seek to accomplish the goal of corrective justice. The last con- 
dition may be accomplished by acceptance of a certain one of 
three facially plausible interpretations of equitable subordination 
doctrine. For convenience, the three possibilities will be labelled 
the Full Subordination Rule, the Offset Rule, and the Con- 
structive Distribution Rule. Under the Full Subordination Rule, 
invocation of the doctrine automatically and invariably implies 
full subordination of all creditor claims of the controlling party, 
and nothing else.4" As a result, the insider may in some cases be 
penalized in an amount greater than the unjust advantage he 
reaped from his controlling position. The second and third in- 
terpretations are supposed to be corrective but not punitive 
the controlling party is subordinated only to the extent of the un- 
fair advantage taken of the corporation.47 Under the Offset Rule, 
the nonpunitive objective is construed to mean that the amount of 
the unjust benefit will be deducted from the insider's legitimate 
creditor claim and then the estate will be distributed pro rata.48 
rupt estate are ignored throughout this initial phase of the analysis because they do 
not significantly affect the thrust of the argument. The true importance of trans- 
action costs is explored in section II.B. infra. As will become apparent as the 
analysis unfolds, the restrictive condition of a simple situation is principally im- 
portant for legal doctrine because complex situations may entail very high trans- 
action costs by making proof and analysis of particular facts quite expensive or 
impossible. In a sense, condition (a) is included in condition (b). However, I 
think it useful to treat the transaction costs generated by complex situations 
seperately. The kinds of transaction costs which I intend to negate by condition 
(b) will appear from the discussion in section II.B. infra. 
46 I assume throughout the logical implication of the Full Subordination Rule, as 
defined in text, that one is not treating equitable subordination as a remedy in 
addition to the fraudulent conveyance action. The additive view is suggested rarely, 
if at all, in the cases. In one cryptic case, after holding prebankruptcy secured trans- 
actions void as preferences and fraudulent conveyances, the referee and court sub- 
ordinated the remaining claim that the creditor did prove because of "the 'in- 
sider' or alter ego nature of this matter." In re Sales Incentives Corp., 327 F.Supp. 
937, 940 (D.R.I. 1971). The case may be an example of using equitable subordina- 
tion as a response to inadequate initial capitalization, a problem not dealt with by 
traditional fraudulent conveyance law, see section II.C. infra. See also the dis- 
cussion of In re Process-Manz in note 63 infra. 
47 The power of equitable subordination 
should not operate to take away anything punitively to which one creditor 
is justly entitled in view of the liquidation finality, and bestow it upon 
others, who in the relative situation have no fair right to it. It can therefore 
ordinarily go no farther than to level off actual inequitable disparities on the 
bankruptcy terrain for which a creditor is responsible, to the point where 
they will not create unjust disadvantages in claim positions and liquidation 
results. 
In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., I44 F.2d 791, 800-oi (8th Cir. I944). See 
also Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 97 (1942); Farmers Bank v. 
Julian, 383 F.2d 314, 323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. Io2I (1967). 
48I have not found any case which clearly applies the Offset Rule. It is 
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Finally, under the Constructive Distribution Rule the pro rata 
shares would be computed as if the tainted transaction had not 
occurred and the controlling party is then considered to have 
already received an anticipatory distribution in the amount of his 
unjust benefit.49 Although the case law and commentary on equi- 
table subordination remedies have failed to properly distinguish 
analyzed here because, in numerous conversations with practicing lawyers about 
what a nonpunitive rule of equitable subordination would be, I have heard the 
Offset Rule, or something like it, suggested. This interpretation is discussed here 
since it may be useful to point out that this Rule is one of those ideas that may 
seem solid upon first perception but dissolves with a little analysis. 
49 Again, I know of no case which clearly expresses the rule in question. Cases 
enunciating the nonpunitive ideal generally do not present the issue squarely. In In 
re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., I44 F.2d 791, 8oo-oi (8th Cir. I944), for example, 
the trustee had brought a separate action to recover an inequitable payment to 
the controlling party, and the Court of Appeals simply upheld the district court's 
reversal of the referee's subordination of the controlling party's much larger, and 
properly acquired, creditor claim. The result is nonpunitive but the court was not 
called upon to choose any mode of subordination; given the separate action it 
could prevent a penalty by refusing to subordinate. 
Given the thesis advanced herein, see sections II.B. and C. infra, as to the rea- 
sons for the existence of equitable subordination doctrine - one of which is the 
desideratum in complex cases of providing a blanket analysis and a crude remedy - 
it is not at all surprising that equitable subordination cases contain no or weak 
discussions of remedial alternatives, or that many of them simply apply a Full 
Subordination Rule despite the notion that equity is simply geared to righting 
wrongs, not punishing them. 
Most of the cases discussed in note 63 infra assumed or stated without discus- 
sion that the remedy against the controlling party was (or would have been) total 
subordination, or perhaps disallowance. Commentators have been more self- 
conscious in their discussion of remedies, and less happy with widespread use of 
full subordination. One acknowledges that in complex cases, like Deep Rock, 
discussed at pp. 526-27 infra, the controlling parties' claims have been totally 
subordinated (though noting that lower courts and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission have approved compromises), but asserts that "[i]n the absence of 
complexity only so much of the parent's claim will be subordinated as is necessary 
to make the injured subsidiary whole." Note, The Deep Rock Doctrine: Inexorable 
Command or Equitable Remedy?, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 808-09 (I947). Another 
notes the argument that the test should be "discriminating and should penalize the 
parent only for advances which are themselves unfair," such as one that an in- 
formed outside lender would not have made. Note, supra note 42, at 1047. See also 
Rembar, Claims Against Affiliated Companies in Reorganization, 39 COLUM. L. 
REV. 907, 916 (I939). Another suggests that in an inadequate initial capitalization 
or a mismanagement case there should ideally be subordination of the controlling 
party's claim only to the extent of the inadequacy or mismanagement, but that 
where there is inadequate capitalization plus inequitable conduct in an extreme 
(complex) case, or where no more accurate remedy appears practical, there should 
be total subordination. Krotinger, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach 
to Parent-Subsidiary Law, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1132-33, II35, 1138 (I942). 
Herzog and Zweibel, supra note 42, at 85-88, are concerned with the infrequently 
consequential distinction between subordination and disallowance, and generally 
argue for the former. 
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among these three rules, a comparison of their effects in the exam- 
ples which follow indicates that the determination of which rule to 
apply has significant consequences for the remedy in the case. 
Moreover, it will be shown that the Constructive Distribution 
Rule best accomplishes the goal of corrective justice posited 
above. 
i. The Alpha Situation: Estate Insolvent Apart from Tainted 
Transaction. Milkable Corporation (M), which is controlled 
by a sole stockholder (S), owned assets with a fair salable value 
of $150. Previously, it had entered into a bona fide borrowing 
transaction at market interest rates with S, who thus became a 
creditor with a $100 claim. It had also bought goods on credit 
from a supplier who thus became an outside creditor (OC) with 
a claim of $100. There were and are no other creditors. In the 
absence of transaction costs, if, without more, M were to go into 
bankruptcy, S and OC would each receive $75. Let us refer to 
S's $75 share in the bankrupt estate under such innocent con- 
ditions as S's Just Share of the estate. This set of facts will be 
referred to as the Alpha Situation. 
Suppose, however, that in fact S received a gratuitous or 
unfair benefit (in general, an Unjust Benefit) from M within 
some reasonable period before bankruptcy. The exact form in 
which S obtains a benefit without paying full consideration to M 
is not important: S may have caused M to pay $70 for services 
that S did not perform; M may have declared the money as a 
dividend to S; S may have sold goods to M at a price $70 in 
excess of the market price, or M could have sold goods to S at 
$70 less than the market price; or S could have used the com- 
pany's car or yacht for his personal use without compensation 
to the company. Further; the creation of the legitimate amount 
owed S and the illegitimate transfer of benefit to him may have 
occurred in the same transaction, for example, a credit sale of 
goods by S to M for $170, where the market price was only $100. 
All that is required at this point is an analytical ability to separate 
out S's legitimate claim from the component of unjust benefit 
conferred. 
If M's estate is distributed in bankruptcy without any attack 
on the $70 benefit paid to S for bogus services, S and OC, having 
equal creditor claims of $100, will each receive $40, or one half 
of the assets of the estate remaining after the payment for bogus 
services ($150-$70=$80), and S will keep his $70. As a re- 
sult, S will have obtained $110 and OC will have obtained $40. 
If the transfer for bogus services had not occurred, however, each 
would have received one half of the company's $150 in assets, 
that is, his $75 Just Share. 
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Obviously, the legal system is called upon to make some sort 
of response to the bogus payment for services since such pay- 
ments by a debtor to a controlling person at the latter's direction 
violate the principle of Respect. Intuitively, if the aim of the 
ideal legal response to S's conduct is not punitive - a proposition 
that will later be examined and, in general, defended - its task 
is to construct a doctrine that will lead to the result that would 
have occurred upon liquidation of M if S had not engaged in the 
wrongful conduct. S, in other words, should wind up with neither 
more nor less than his Just Share of $75. How the parties will 
actually fare under the major remedial tools now available, 
fraudulent conveyance law and equitable subordination doctrine, 
turns out to depend on which of the three plausible interpreta- 
tions of equitable subordination is employed, and whether the 
amount of the Unjust Benefit is less than or greater than S's 
Just Share of the estate. The following paragraphs will illustrate 
these relationships. 
(a) Where amount of Unjust Benefit to the controlling party 
is less than his Just Share. - Consider the Alpha Situation when 
the amount of the payment to S for bogus services is, as supposed 
above, $70. Fraudulent conveyance law is precisely suited to 
correcting such bogus payments.50 The trustee (T) in bank- 
ruptcy could sue S to recover $70 for the bankrupct estate.51 In 
particular, he might invoke UFCA ? 4, since the transfer to S 
was without fair consideration while the estate was insolvent. 
The estate, now augmented to $150, would be divided equally 
50 The text makes fraudulent conveyance law appear neater than it is. In a 
case where the transferee gave some but not fair consideration for the benefit 
conferred upon him, the analysis is more complicated. If the transferee acted 
"without actual fraudulent intent" he may retain the property transferred as 
security for return of the amount paid or consideration given. See Bankruptcy Act 
? 67d(6), II U.S.C. ? Io7(d)(6) (I970); UFCA ? 9(2). Usually, however, a con- 
trolling party who makes himself transferee for inadequate consideration will 
have displayed actual fraudulent intent within the meaning of these provisions, 
with the result that the transfer will be voided in toto. This is not in theory a 
punitive result, however, since after surrendering the transferred property he can 
then prove an unsecured claim in bankruptcy for the amount of the consideration 
actually paid. See 4 J. MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, l 67.41 at 605, 597 n.57. 
On the other hand, this result is punitive in practice when compared to the happier 
fate of a controlling party who in one trasaction with his corporation paid equal 
value for a transfer and in a second transaction simply caused a transfer without 
giving any consideration: upsetting only the second transaction, as seems feasible 
under a fraudulent conveyance approach, still leaves him with the benefit trans- 
ferred in the first transaction, instead of with a provable claim on which he can 
hope to obtain only a few cents on the dollar. In other words, the rules work 
more harshly on those who integrate unfairness into their regular dealings than on 
those who keep their self-dealing clear and distinct. 
51 Bankruptcy Act ?? 67d, 7oe, II U.S.C. ?? Io7(d), IIo(e) (I970). 
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between OC's and S's legitimate claims, and each would therefore 
receive $75. 
What would happen if T decided to invoke the doctrine of 
equitable subordination against S is less clear, for the answer 
depends upon which interpretation of that doctrine one selects. If 
the Full Subordination Rule were selected, T would bring no 
action for recovery of any amount from S, but would simply 
distribute the bankrupt estate, a non-augmented $80, first in 
satisfaction of OC's $100 claim. There being no remainder, S 
winds up with $70, the amount of the bogus payment, which is 
$5 less than his Just Share. Thus, when the Unjust Benefit is 
less than the Just Share, S has been penalized relative to what he 
would have received were the law aimed solely at undoing his 
wrong. Under the Offset Rule, the $70 S has already received 
would be deducted from his $100 claim and the $80 remaining 
in the estate would be divided between OC (who had as yet 
received no satisfaction of his $100 claim) and S on a Ioo/30 
basis, yielding $61.54 for OC and $18.46 for S who, taking into 
account his prior $70 benefit for bogus services, winds up with 
$88.46. Since the result for S is $13.46 better than his Just Share, 
the Offset Rule leads in this instance to undercorrection of his 
misconduct. Finally, under the Constructive Distribution Rule 
T would deem the estate to contain $150, would compute each of 
the two creditors' shares as being $75, and would deem $70 of 
S's share to have already been paid. Of the $80 actually left in 
the estate, OC would therefore obtain $75 and S would receive 
$5. The ultimate result is that S obtains exactly his Just Share 
which is the result that a fraudulent conveyance action would 
have reached. 
b. Where amount of Unjust Benefit to the controlling party 
is greater than his Just Share. - Consider now the Alpha Situa- 
tion when the amount of the payment for bogus services was $80. 
If T brings a fraudulent conveyance action this amount will be 
recovered for the bankrupt estate and S will wind up receiving 
his Just Share, as in the preceding case. 
Under the Full Subordination Rule, T simply attempts to 
satisfy OC's claim first. OC receives the amount of the non- 
augmented estate, $70, while S keeps his $80 prior payment. 
Since S's Just Share is only $75, S's having received the bogus 
payment has netted him an unfair advantage even after the 
application of the doctrine of equitable subordination. In con- 
trast to the facts discussed in a, the Full Subordination Rule now 
leads to undercorrection rather than overcorrection. 
Given the Alpha Situation and an Unjust Benefit of $80, the 
second interpretation of equitable subordination, the Offset Rule, 
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again leads to undercorrection. S's $100 claim is reduced by the 
amount of his unfair advantage to $20 and the non-augmented 
estate of $70 is then distributed to OC and S on a Ioo/20 basis. 
OC thus receives $58.33. S receives $11.67, which, together with 
the prior payment of $80, gives him $16.67 more than his Just 
Share. 
Whether the third interpretation, the Constructive Distribu- 
tion Rule, will again, as in subsection (a) above, avoid both 
undercorrection and penalties depends on the resolution of a new 
ambiguity. T deems the estate to contain $150, as it would 
absent the payment for bogus services, computes OC's and S's 
shares to be $75 each, and deems S already to have received a 
bankruptcy distribution of $80 (the amount of the Unjust 
Benefit). The question remaining is whether T will regard this 
constructive bankruptcy distribution to S to be an irreversible 
fait accompli, even though excessive, so that OC will receive only 
the remaining $70 in the estate and suffer from a failure to achieve 
corrective justice, or whether T will invoke an asserted equitable 
power52 to recover the amount of the $5 overpayment to S. 
Judicial opinions appear never to have focused sharply on these 
two alternatives, so that a definitive answer in terms of existing 
law cannot be given. If the overpayment recovery were considered 
and allowed - as I assume it would be - the analytical process 
would certainly push the court more strongly toward an aware- 
ness of the essential similarity of equitable subordination doctrine 
and fraudulent conveyance law. 
2. The Beta Situation: The Tainted Transaction Creates 
Insolvency. -Suppose that M had owned assets with a fair 
salable value of $200. As before, S and OC each have a legitimate 
creditor claim against M of $100. Each party's Just Share of M 
upon liquidation is $100. Let us refer to this set of facts as the 
Beta Situation. 
If S were to take an Unjust Benefit from M of $90, which is 
less than the amount of his Just Share, M would be rendered 
insolvent and might go into bankruptcy. As in Alpha, a fraudulent 
conveyance action by T against S would set matters exactly 
straight, as would application of the Constructive Distribution 
Rule. But unlike the result in the Alpha situation where Unjust 
Benefit exceeded Just Share, the Full Subordination Rule would 
now lead to a merely corrective result rather than a penalty. 
Thanks to the pre-unfair-transfer condition of solvency, full 
52 Cf. In re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co., 73 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. I934) (without 
direct authority in Bankruptcy Act, court orders recovery of dividends paid out 
of the estate pursuant to an order later reversed). See ? 57g, II U.S.C. ? 93(g) 
(I970). 
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subordination and the resulting full satisfaction of OC's claim 
does not give him more than his Just Share, with a resulting 
penalty upon S. As for the Offset Rule, it now leads to proper 
correction rather than undercorrection, for essentially the same 
reason. 
If, however, the Unjust Benefit taken by S had been $110, 
thus exceeding his Just Share, problems of undercorrection re- 
emerge. Fraudulent conveyance law and the Constructive Dis- 
tribution Rule will again yield a simple corrective result.53 The 
Full Subordination Rule now leads to undercorrection -OC 
gets only the $90 left in the estate as in Alpha, part b. The 
Offset Rule now also leads to undercorrection, at least if one 
assumes that S's legitimate claim cannot be effectively reduced 
below zero under this rule. OC and S would share the non- 
augmented estate of $90 on a Ioo/o basis; OC gets $90, which 
is less than his Just Share. 
* * * 
It is hoped that the systematic considerations set forth above 
will lead one to conclude that the Constructive Distribution Rule 
is theoretically the best of the three interpretations of equitable 
subordination. Since the Full Subordination Rule can grant a 
boon rather than impose a punishment - as when the Unjust 
Benefit is greater than the Just Share and the estate is already 
insolvent - one cannot justify the Rule on the theory that fraud, 
whether actual or constructive, should be punished as well as 
corrected. Furthermore, the variations in outcome depend on 
mathematical relationships between Unjust Benefit and Just 
Share that have nothing to do with the legal policies involved. 
Indeed, from one point of view the relationships are positively 
counterintuitive: other figures being .kept equal, the controlling 
party will maximize the legally retainable benefits from an unfair 
transaction by increasing the degree of unfairness.54 The Offset 
53 They will always yield a corrective response under the restrictive conditions 
governing this analysis. 
54 It should be noted that in some situations application of the Full Subordina- 
tion Rule will lead to the same result as a successful fraudulent conveyance 
action for reasons other than an accidental equivalence between Unjust Benefit 
and Just Share. One pattern is that presented when the pre-bankruptcy transfer 
of an Unjust Benefit to the controlling parties consisted of creating a nominal 
creditor claim on the part of those persons against the corporation, and the con- 
trolling parties have no other, legitimate creditor claims against it. The well known 
case of Costello v. Fazio. 256 F.2d 903 (gth Cir. I958) is a beautiful example of 
this pattern. Two of the partners in a failing business attempted to "withdraw" 
a substantial portion of their equity investment in the partnership by converting 
it into demand notes. The partnership was then incorporated, the notes were 
assumed, and the corporation marched straight into the valley of bankruptcy. 
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Rule, while never leading to overcorrection, does frequently lead 
to undercorrection. Further examples would indicate a relation- 
ship that might be intuitively obvious to a mathematician, namely, 
that in ordinary situations (insolvency even apart from the tainted 
transaction), the degree of undercorrection is mitigated insofar 
as (a) the amount of the Unjust Benefit is less than the amount 
of S's Just Share and (b) the face amount of S's legitimate 
creditor claim is less than the face amount of OC's creditor claim. 
In a sense, then, the deviations from simple corrective justice 
caused by the Offset Rule are arbitrary in a more complex fashion 
than those caused by the Full Subordination Rule. The Con- 
structive Distribution Rule, however, always results in exactly 
corrective justice. Therefore, if the Constructive Distribution 
Rule is the best interpretation, the results of equitable sub- 
ordination and of fraudulent conveyance law are functionally 
equivalent. 
The notion that equitable subordination may be a substitute 
for a fraudulent conveyance action is illustrated by almost all of 
the leading subordination cases. To take an example, the cele- 
brated equitable subordination case, Taylor v. Standard Gas & 
Electric Co. (Deep Rock),55 involved a complex series of in- 
equitable or highly suspicious actions by Standard, the parent 
corporation in control of the debtor corporation (Deep Rock). 
(i) Standard caused Deep Rock to enter into a lease with another 
subsidiary which was unfair to Deep Rock. The subsidiary was 
then required to turn the lease receipts over to Standard.56 (2) 
Standard caused Deep Rock to enter into a management contract 
with another subsidiary and pay it steep management fees.57 
(3) Standard charged interest at a high rate on its open account 
with Deep Rock.58 (4) Standard caused Deep Rock to pay it 
dividends when Deep Rock could hardly afford them.59 Given 
If the business is regarded as having been one continuing business, and the switch 
from partnership to corporate form is therefore disregarded, the case presents a 
rather simple and straightforward example of a fraudulent conveyance: the busi- 
ness, while insolvent, transferred a benefit (the notes) to certain persons without 
receiving fair consideration. The response under fraudulent conveyance law would 
be that the trustee would seek to recover the benefit by bringing a suit to void the 
notes. In the actual case, equitable subordination, as operationalized by the Full 
Subordination Rule, yielded the same result. The court, in fact, did not even 
mention that the transaction was a fraudulent conveyance, possibly because it 
overcautiously thought that the switch from partnership to corporate status cre- 
ated problems under that analysis. 
55 306 U.S. 307 (I939). 
56Id. at 319-20. 
57 Id. at 311. 
58 Id. at 320. 
59 d. at 317. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:28:26 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1977] REMEDIES OF CORPORATE CREDITORS 527 
the continuous inadequacy of Deep Rock's capitalization,60 and 
assuming (as the Court undoubtedly did) unfairness in these 
transactions, all of them were fraudulent conveyances.61 
Pepper v. Litton 62 presents a neater example of this sub- 
stitution. Scheming to defraud the corporation's creditors, a 
controlling stockholder accumulated large, unpaid salary claims 
owing to himself. Suing on them, he caused the corporation to 
confess judgment and used the judgment, as well as other delay- 
ing actions, to hinder a major creditor. The corporation's in- 
currence of the salary claim was, under the circumstances, a 
fraudulent conveyance.63 
60 See id. at 310 (from its organization "two jumps ahead of the wolf"). 
1 See UFCA ? 5. 
The Deep Rock case may also illustrate complementary uses of equitable sub- 
ordination doctrine. If the Court thought the initial undercapitalization was a 
sufficient basis for subordination -I doubt that it did -then fraudulent convey- 
ance law could not substitute for equitable subordination since no transfer would 
be involved. A more convincing and important point is that the subordination of 
Standard's creditor claims to the claims of Deep Rock's preferred shareholders 
would not be possible under fraudulent conveyance law. See generally section II.C. 
infra. 
62 308 U.S. 295 (I939). 
63 See UFCA ?? i, 7. 
Other important cases also suggest that equitable subordination can substitute 
for fraudulent conveyance law. In Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 
335 U.S. 211 (1948), the majority affirmed a plan of reorganization which accepted 
as valid the claim of a parent railroad company against its subsidiary on the basis 
of the lower court's finding of fair dealing. 335 U.S. at 230. The dissenters, how- 
ever, pointed to eleven instances of loans by the parent to the subsidiary which 
were followed within a few days by dividends of similar or slightly smaller amounts 
from the subsidiary to the parent. Id. at 240. The dissent argued that compelling 
the subsidiary to pay dividends while it was debt-heavy and cash-poor was the 
type of "mismanagement" that should lead to equitable subordination. Id. at 247. 
The dissenters were rightly suspicious, though they would have been more persua- 
sive if they had not focused on the dividend payments. If the loans are integrated 
with the dividends, it is seen that the parent was causing the subsidiary to incur 
obligations to itself without giving the subsidiary fair consideration, i.e., full 
equivalent value. To do this when it will leave the subsidiary with inadequate 
capital in relation to its debts is to cause it to effect a voidable fraudulent con- 
veyance. See UFCA ?? 5, 7. The dissent's other bone of contention, that the 
parent for its sole benefit caused the subsidiary to assume obligations of another 
subsidiary without consideration and while the subsidiary was on the threshold of 
reorganization, also involved a fraudulent conveyance, though again this analysis 
was overlooked. 
A fascinating example of the "bootstrapping" fraud, accompanied by an equally 
fascinating judicial response, is provided by In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 
F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. I964), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th 
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 957 (I967). Greatly simplified, the important 
facts were as follows. The shareholders of Manz sold their stock to Lithographers 
on an installment basis. Lithographers later found it financially difficult to make 
payments. An arrangement was worked out whereby Armstrong, a finance com- 
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B. Explanation of the Existence of 
Equitable Subordination Doctrine 
Since equitable subordination is properly viewed largely as a 
functional substitute for fraudulent conveyance law, which the 
trustee in bankruptcy is well able to invoke, why did equitable 
subordination ever come into existence? The answer to this 
question emerges when one begins lifting the three restrictive 
conditions that form the context of the Alpha and Beta Situations 
discussed above. Two of these conditions, which are obviously 
related, were zero transaction costs and simple transactions. 
One set of transaction costs contributing to the early de- 
velopment of equitable subordination may have been no more 
than speculative. Bankruptcy trustees appear to have believed 
pany, obtained a mortgage on the real estate of Manz and a security interest in 
some of its personal property. Of the loan proceeds given by Armstrong, however, 
about $I.5 million actually went to old, selling shareholders of Manz, discharging 
obligations of Lithographers. At the direction of Armstrong's chief counsel, this 
aspect of the transaction was dressed up as a redemption of Manz preferred stock 
held by Lithographers. 236 F. Supp. at 337-39. The $I,500,000 did not really 
benefit Manz, which therefore did not receive fair consideration for the note and 
security interests it gave. Armstrong wanted as security, not only the Manz stock 
which its real borrower, Lithographers, could pledge to it, but also the assets of 
Manz, for it was only by an interest in the latter that it could hope to come ahead 
of Manz's creditors. Manz later went into Chapter XI proceedings. Because of 
Armstrong's knowledge and participation, the referee in bankruptcy, and the dis- 
trict court in affirming, explicitly held the mortgage liens void as violating various 
fraudulent conveyance rules (Bankruptcy Act ? 67d(2)(b)-(d), II U.S.C. ? 107(d) 
(2) (b)-(d) (I970)). Id. at 346-47. The transfers were also found voidable as part 
of a conspiracy to cause an illegal stock redemption- illegal because of Manz's in- 
solvency. Id. at 348; see part IV infra. 
In addition, the referee and district court invoked equitable subordination 
doctrine to subordinate the entire claim of Armstrong against Manz, on an alter 
ego theory. Armstrong was not really a creditor of Manz but a holder, through 
its loans to Lithographers, of stock in Manz, and should therefore be paid only 
after the creditors of Manz were satisfied. Id. at 348. Strangely, though the dis- 
cussions of fraudulent conveyance rules and equitable subordination were only a 
few paragraphs apart, the district court seems not to have noticed that the claims 
effectively might have been subordinated under fraudulent conveyance rules by 
voiding them as obligations fraudulently incurred by Manz, see Bankruptcy Act 
? 67d(2)(c), (d), ii U.S.C. ? Io7(d)(2) (c), (d) (1970), with the result that Arm- 
strong could share in the estate only as holder of Manz stock (which it was). If 
ever there were a case in which the functional substitutability of fraudulent con- 
veyance law and equitable subordination doctrine could easily be observed, this 
was it; yet, the court does not observe the parallel. 
See also Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); International Tel. & 
Tel. Corp. v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. I957); In re Dean & Jean Fashions, 
Inc., 329 F. Supp. 663 (W.D. Okla. 1971). None of the above subordination cases 
expressly analyzed the relationships between fraudulent conveyance law and equita- 
ble subordination. 
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that in order to recover fraudulently transferred property from 
claim-filing creditors of the estate, they could not act within the 
so-called summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,64 but 
rather had to initiate more expensive plenary proceedings. Before 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Katchen v. Landy,65 it may not 
have been clear to courts and litigants that a bankruptcy court 
without possession of the fraudulently transferred property in- 
deed had summary jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief against 
a fraudulent transferee who did not affirmatively consent to 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction but merely presented a claim that 
could be disallowed or subordinated on grounds of fraud or the 
like. Invoking a fraudulent conveyance theory would have sug- 
gested starting new, and expensive, litigation in another forum.66 
When the trustee invokes equitable subordination, however, every- 
thing relevant thereto emerges safely within the scope of the 
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction, for the trustee is 
simply objecting to the pro rata allowance of a claim. Before 
64 See generally Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is It Too Summary?, 39 
S. CAL. L. REV. 78 (I966). Treister states that summary jurisdiction is the only 
kind of jurisdiction that bankruptcy courts have, since plenary suits proceed in a 
state forum or in a federal district court not sitting in its capacity as bankruptcy 
court. This is generally true, though it apparently overlooks the possibility of 
plenary proceedings in the bankruptcy court, see Bankruptcy Act ?? 6ob, 67e, 
7oe(3), II U.S.C. ?? 96(b), Io7(e), IIo(e)(3) (1970). But see note 65 infra. 
65382 U.S. 323 (I966). 
Under the confusing language of ? 67e of the Bankruptcy Act, a trustee 
might have brought a fraudulent conveyance action against a transferee or 
obligee (even if the latter had not presented a claim in the bankruptcy court) in 
an appropriate state court or in a "court of bankruptcy," but the provision had 
been interpreted to require the trustee to confine his choice to a state court or a 
United States district court (rather than the bankruptcy judge as such), unless 
there was some other ground to litigate the matter in the bankruptcy court. See 
2 J. MOORE ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1T 23.15, at 605, 622-23 (I4th ed. rev. 
I973). Venue, service of process, pleading, and practice in plenary suits under ? 
67e are discussed in 4 J. MOORE ET AL., supra note i, at 1IT 67.46, 67.47. 
Katchen held that one who filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding might 
be compelled to surrender preferences that under Bankruptcy Act ? 57g would 
require disallowance of the claim. In view of ? 57g's language, the reasoning of the 
case would extend to cases involving voidable fraudulent transfers. In hindsight, a 
precursor of Katchen may be seen in a well-known fraudulent conveyance case 
that interpreted narrowly the rule that a plenary suit was required when the 
property in question was in the actual possession of a "substantial adverse claimant." 
See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (I94I). 
66 While proceeding in a district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro- 
cedure is not, given the present Bankruptcy Rules, significantly more burdensome 
than an adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy judge, the district court pro- 
ceeding may involve considerably more delay and may, in former times, have in- 
volved additional procedural burdens. Notice that a plenary suit is still needed 
when an insider has caused the corporate debtor to make a fraudulent transfer to 
a third party and recovery is sought from that party. 
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Katchen v. Landy, then, the doctrine may have functioned as a 
way of avoiding the burdens of the plenary suit which apparently 
was always called for by fraudulent conveyance theory.67 
A more likely explanation of equitable subordination appears 
when one lifts the assumption about simple transactions. In 
fact, many of the equitable subordination cases-Pepper v. 
Litton68 is the classic example - involved an incredibly com- 
plex series of controlling party transfers and other transactions. 
It would be extremely difficult and costly, if not impossible, to 
attempt to analyze separately each step in the series, to assess 
all the evidence relating thereto, to make numerous separate 
findings as to insolvency and fairness of consideration, and to 
draw conclusions as to the proper amount of recovery at each 
step under the apparently exacting tests of the UFCA.69 Though 
67 Logically, this explanation of equitable subordination really constitutes just 
a reason for the trustee's avoiding a fraudulent conveyance action seeking affirma- 
tive recovery. He could theoretically do this without using equitable subordination 
doctrine as the avoidance device. For example, he could raise the objection under 
Bankruptcy Act ? 57g, II U.S.C. ? 39(g) (I970), that the insider's claim should be 
disallowed because he had made a fraudulent transfer. Since in the common, sub- 
stantively insolvent estate, subordination is practically equivalent to disallowance, 
this approach would yield the same result as equitable subordination doctrine 
(applied in light of the Full Subordination Rule), except that it would give the 
insider an additional, sometimes advantageous, option: that of surrendering the 
fraudulently transferred property to become able to have his claim allowed. The 
positive reasons for choosing equitable subordination as the avoidance device are 
given subsequently in the text. 
68 308 U.S. 295 (I939). 
69 Consider the following: 
The basis of [the] claim [subordination of which was in question] was an 
open account which embraced transactions between Standard and Deep 
Rock from the latter's organization in 1919 to the receivership in I933. The 
account consists of thousands of items of debit and credit. 
. . .Many transactions entered in the account were attacked as fraudu- 
lent .. 
Without going into the minutiae of the transactions between the two 
companies, enough may be stated to expose the reasons for our decision. ... 
. . .It is impossible to recast Deep Rock's history and experience so as 
even to approximate what would be its financial condition at this day had 
it been adequately capitalized and independently managed and had its fiscal 
affairs been conducted with an eye single to its own interests. 
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 3II-I2, 315, 323 (1939) (emphasis 
supplied). 
The vast extent of the railroad business carried on by the Missouri Pacific 
and the New Orleans during the long past period of alleged mismanagement 
and the intricate corporate structures of the railroads, inevitably presented 
most serious problems in the attempts of accountants to picture what their 
course of operations and financial transactions had been.... There was 
fundamental controversy as to what inferences should be drawn from the 
available accounts to establish the true financial condition of the New Orleans 
at different times .... 
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fraudulent conveyance law conceivably could be broadened to 
sanction a gestalt approach comparable to the step transactions 
doctrine in tax law,70 rather than to require a transaction-by- 
transaction analysis and legal conclusion in all cases, it has 
seemed less violent to tradition to invoke a more obviously 
amorphous doctrine to which the label "equitable" is attached. 
The third restrictive condition used in our earlier analysis 
was that equitable subordination should seek to do corrective 
justice, eschewing both undercorrection of fraudulent and unfair 
transfers and punishment of the participants in them. Unlike 
the other two conditions, which are simplified assumptions about 
how the world is, this condition is a policy judgment about what 
the law's goal ought to be. Pressure to give up or deemphasize 
the goal of precise corrective justice is, of course, generated by 
the very factual complexity which made the second condition 
unrealistic. Complexity not only drives courts to devise a doctrine 
that will avoid the necessity of applying all of the criteria of a 
fraudulent conveyance to each segment of a complicated series 
of transactions. It also pressures them to adopt the simple Full 
Subordination Rule rather than the precisely corrective Con- 
structive Distribution Rule, since the latter obviously requires 
that a greater number of specific facts be determined. 
Nevertheless, a nonpunitive interpretation of equitable sub- 
ordination - the view that the doctrine ought not to be applied 
in a way known to be punitive in the particular case - is generally 
justified, and not a condition that ought to be abandoned. Even 
if in all cases equitable subordination doctrine could achieve 
punishment in proportion to some relevant index of guilt, many 
of the transactions characterized as fraudulent, both for pur- 
poses of fraudulent conveyance law and equitable subordina- 
tion, involve conduct which is not clearly shown in litigation to 
be willfully wrong or criminal in nature or to betoken moral 
depravity in any ordinary sense. Though some cases involve in- 
tentional wrongs such as deliberate falsification of records,71 most 
cases of fraud and mismanagement involve less obvious wrongs 
and may frequently be proven in court only in terms of mechanical 
financial tests. For example, the corporation may have paid, 
Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 2II, 223-24 (1948) (quoting 
Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 163 F.2d 350, 356 (8th Cir. I947)). 
70 See, e.g., Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (I954). 
71 Deliberate falsification of records is an intentional wrong that might be sub- 
ject under ordinary tort principles to punitive damages, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 683-86, 735-36 (4th ed. I97I), and criminal prosecution, 
see, e.g., i8 U.S.C. ? 152 (1970). 
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while insolvent, what is now found an excessive salary.72 Because 
plaintiffs in civil cases are required to prove their cases by only 
a preponderance of evidence and because morally opprobrious 
fraud may be punished through other techniques,73 regarding 
fraudulent conveyance law and equitable subordination as basi- 
cally corrective rather than punitive seems more reasonable and 
practical. 
Nonetheless, the fairness of requiring a careful and precise 
examination of evidence and computation of damages in an 
attempt to do corrective justice must be balanced against the 
cost of achieving precision and the mildly punitive attitude that 
the controlling parties should bear the risk of mistakes.7 At 
some point, it becomes obvious that a fraud or mismanagement 
case is so complex that one is justified in substituting a percep- 
tion of an entire pattern of conduct for a sequence of focused 
looks at the elements and the shotgun for the rifle as remedy.75 
Furthermore, judges naturally feel that in uncertain and complex 
cases the fraudulent transferee should bear the risks of remedial 
imprecision. The lure of equitable subordination doctrine may 
be explained in part by the erroneous but understandable belief 
of judges that any imprecision in the corrective function of the 
doctrine typically bears down on and punishes a transferee who 
was in some sense at fault, as by causing the suspicious series 
of transactions.76 
72 Even a long history of spending as if there were no tomorrow will more 
readily trigger exasperation and a desire to oust the rascals than a desire to jail 
them. 
73 In addition to punitive damages in tort suits and criminal penalties, see note 
7I supra, consider the facts that an actual fraudulent conveyance is an act of 
bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Act, ? 3a(I), II U.S.C. ? 21(a)(I) (1970), and a reason 
for denial of the bankrupt's discharge of his debts, Bankruptcy Act, ? I4c(4), II 
U.S.C. ? 32(c)(4) (I970). Admittedly, the latter effect is of little concern to a 
bankrupt corporation. 
74 See part III infra. 
75 A good example of how equitable subordination steps in when a course of 
conduct bothers the court, even though one prior, isolated transaction has been 
corrected by a trustee's action, is given by Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Kirtley, 
338 F.2d ioo6, ioII (8th Cir. I964). 
76 Moreover, the existence of equitable subordination may be partly explained 
by less easily defended judicial objectives, such as the desire to overcome technical 
restraints on fraudulent conveyance actions - for example, the statute of limita- 
tions. See, e.g., Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 226 
(I948). Bankruptcy Act ?67d(2), II U.S.C. ? Io7(d)(2)(I970), makes voidable 
fraudulent transfers made and obligations incurred within one year before filing 
of the bankruptcy petition. An action under ? 7oe, II U.S.C. ? IIo(e) (I970), 
based on state fraudulent conveyance law, would be governed by a state statute 
of limitations. (The UFCA itself contains no limitations period.) In either case, 
the action might not catch the earlier phases of a long history of abusive parent 
company dealings with its subsidiary. 
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C. Complementary Uses of Equitable Subordination 
It must be admitted that equitable subordination can be used 
to achieve results that are foreign to fraudulent conveyance law 
as conventionally formulated, such as protection of preferred or 
minority shareholders (who are not creditors within the meaning 
of the UFCA) and remedying of conduct which defeats the ideal 
of Nonhindrance but does not involve a transfer. Conduct of a 
bankrupt corporation caused by controlling parties may violate 
ideals of Truth, Respect, and Evenhandedness with reference to 
other equity claimants against the enterprise, even though those 
claimants cannot invoke the UFCA or similar law because they 
are not technically creditors.7 In truth, there appears to be 
no good reason why the ideals of Nonhindrance should not be 
imposed on corporate debtors as duties toward their equity 
claimants.78 In this sense, equitable subordination doctrine may 
be viewed as a desirable finishing touch to fraudulent conveyance 
law. 
One instance of the application of equitable subordination to 
a case not involving a transfer is waste of corporate assets by 
controlling parties. If the waste does not cause some sort of 
transfer,79 such as a salary payment to an idle officer, the situa- 
77That fraudulent conveyance law has developed in such a limited way is 
understandable, given its ancient lineage and the relative modernity of the preva- 
lent practice, via the corporate device, of having separate legal entities which can 
own property and conduct business but which are themselves "owned" by separate 
persons. 
78 The Deep Rock case involved subordination of parent company "creditor" 
claims to the claims of preferred shareholders, and those seeking subordination 
in Comstock, discussed in note 6i supra, merely had a security interest in the 
debtor corporation's stock. See also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 338 F.2d 
Ioo6 (8th Cir. 1964) (subordination of dominant stockholders to minority public 
stockholders). 
On the other hand, if fraudulent conveyance law and equitable subordination 
doctrine were expanded to cover all the myriad ways in which one (controlling) 
group of equity claimants achieved a non-pro rata distribution from a corpora- 
tion at the expense of other equity claimants of the same class, they would 
swallow up a very large part of corporate law. To note this is not to suggest that 
Deep Rock opened a floodgate that cannot be closed, but to point out that there 
is an intimate structural and legal relationship between fraud or unfairness which 
harms creditors and that which harms shareholders. Cf. Superintendent of Ins. 
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (Section io(b) of the Securities Ex- 
change Act of 1934 applies against deceptive practices even though creditors of the 
defrauded corporate buyer or seller of securities may be ultimate victims; con- 
trolling stockholder's fiduciary obligation extends to creditors as well as stock- 
holders). A full comparison of fraudulent conveyance principles and insiders' 
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders remains to be made. 
79 Surprisingly, this is rarely the case. Suppose that the corporation's officers 
were simply lazy and did not work very hard to bring in corporate revenues. As 
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tion would not trigger fraudulent conveyance law. Even if 
applicable, fraudulent conveyance law would often lead to only 
partial correction since the harm to the corporation from sheer 
laziness in management, for example, may exceed the entire 
salaries actually paid to the officers.80 For the same reasons of 
cost reduction and administrative convenience that lead trustees 
to transform conventional fraudulent conveyance lawsuits into 
requests that the bankruptcy court grant equitable subordination, 
the trustee will prefer to invoke the latter doctrine rather than 
bring a plenary suit for waste. It should be apparent, though, 
that the simplified remedy of equitable subordination may over- 
shoot or fall short of the mark, depending on the relationship 
between the amount of the claims asserted in bankruptcy by the 
controlling parties and the actual amount of harm caused the 
corporation by their wasteful conduct. 
Besides protecting minority shareholders and providing a 
shotgun approach to wasteful conduct of controlling parties, 
equitable subordination also appears to go beyond fraudulent 
conveyance law in the so-called inadequate capitalization cases. 
Although inadequate capitalization by itself has rarely been a 
sufficient condition to lead to subordination of the controlling 
creditor's claim - and some courts have expressly held that it 
is not sufficient-thin capitalization quite often accompanies 
real deception. An interesting aspect of the cases involving only 
inadequate initial capitalization is that they involve no transfer 
of benefits, except perhaps by analogy to adequate capitalization 
followed later by an unlawful dividend.81 Without a transfer of 
benefits which could in principle be measured and simply undone, 
a result, the corporation becomes insolvent. It could very well be that the conduct 
of the officers implies that their salaries were excessive, and thus, that they caused 
the corporation to make transfers of benefits to them that are voidable under 
UFCA ? 4. 
80 If this is so, an action for waste would seem to be called for, and, perhaps, 
on principles similar to those expressed in proximate causation doctrine in ordinary 
tort law, the officers should be responsible for the entire proximate damage to the 
corporation. Since the trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to all the causes of action of 
the bankrupt corporation, he could, if he wished, bring a plenary suit against the 
officers for waste under state law. However, for the same reasons of cost reduc- 
tion and administrative convenience that lead trustees to transform conventional 
fraudulent conveyance lawsuits into claims that equitable subordination should 
be applied, the trustee will prefer to invoke the latter doctrine rather than bring 
a plenary suit. 
81 The analogy would be to adequate capitalization followed later on by an 
unlawful dividend, which would be a violation of the normative ideal of Respect. 
The analogy is probably not accurate, because the actual presence of the adequate 
capital during the interim between organization and the dividend later deemed 
unlawful would probably have helped the corporation to perform better and 
would thus have saved the creditors some loss. 
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choosing the scope of the creditors' remedy for the harm resulting 
from inadequate capitalization is difficult. The choice is essen- 
tially between automatic full subordination of the shareholders' 
creditor claims, or an attempt to compensate the outside creditors 
for that portion of their prospective loss in bankruptcy proxi- 
mately caused by the inadequate capitalization itself. In most 
cases, realistically attempting the latter task would be too dif- 
ficult, and the court would therefore be driven to use a blanket 
subordination of all creditor claims of the relevant controlling 
parties. In any event, a similar point can be made in the in- 
adequate capital situation as in the case of the pure waste 
situation: equitable subordination is a functional substitute for, 
though not an equivalent of, a trustee action to "pierce the 
corporate veil" under state law. The substitution may not be 
adequate, since in some cases the outside creditors' harm from 
inadequate capitalization may not be corrected in full by a mere 
subordination of the controlling party's claims, and in other cases 
the response may be essentially punitive. 
As suggested, it is unclear that in actual cases equitable sub- 
ordination ever results merely from inadequate capitalization.82 
In one view, even the most extreme degree of leverage does 
not, by itself, cause a debt claim to cease to be a debt claim; the 
question of fairness really resolves itself into one of full dis- 
closure to outside creditors, with a meaningful opportunity given 
them to bargain for higher interest payments as compensation 
82 In neither Deep Rock nor Pepper v. Litton, nor in any of the cases cited in 
note 63 supra, did inadequate initial capitalization of a controlled subsidiary truly 
function as a sole and sufficient basis for subordination. There is language sug- 
gesting that inadequate initial capitalization was sufficient for subordination in 
the Holton, Costello, and Dean & Jean Fashions cases, see note 63 supra, but all of 
these cases involved an attempt to convert an equity interest into a debt interest 
in an ongoing business enterprise (thus producing inadequate capitalization): there 
was objectionable inadequacy of "initial" capital only if one focuses on the new 
corporate entities in those cases and not on the underlying businesses. Furthermore, 
some cases explicitly indicate that inadequate capitalization is not a sufficient 
basis for subordination. E.g., In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256, 
262 (N.D.N.Y. I968); accord, In re Branding Iron Steak House, BANKR. L. REP. 
(CCH) i 65,983 (9th Cir. May 24, I976) (mere initial undercapitalization not 
enough to justify subordinating claims of an officer and director). 
On the other hand, an occasional subordination case is difficult to explain as 
anything but a pure inadequate initial capitalization case. See e.g., Arnold v. 
Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (I94I). In that case 
the insider's later purchase at a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust, whereby 
he acquired, in exchange for his unpaid claims, property of the corporation that 
was of substantially greater value, could have been characterized as a fraudulent 
conveyance, but this interpretation is not consonant with the court's language and 
its remedy (subordination of all initial, but not later, advances, rather than subordi- 
nation of claims to the extent of the excess value of the foreclosed property). 
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for the extreme risk of default.83 Inadequate capitalization with- 
out any deception might be a basis for subordinating insiders' 
claims as against tort creditors, on the ground that even apart 
from statutory requirements (which are almost always met), 
organizers of the corporation have a duty to provide a "reason- 
able" amount of net worth for the benefit of persons who might 
be injured by their tortious activities, but even here the law has 
displayed very mixed results.84 To foreshadow a theme taken up 
at greater length in part IV,85 viewing inadequate initial capital- 
ization of a corporation as a wrong to any creditors would appear 
to invoke affirmative duties to creditors going beyond the simple 
prohibitions of the ideals of Nonhindrance. 
In summary, equitable subordination is not only a functional 
equivalent of conventional fraudulent conveyance law occasioned 
by procedural and administrative factors, but also serves the 
purpose of expanding application of the ideals of Truth, Respect, 
and possibly Evenhandedness to situations which are not covered 
by technical fraudulent conveyance law because it is, perhaps 
arbitrarily, limited in its coverage to debtholder claimants against 
the debtor and to debtors who make or suffer transfers of benefits. 
III. THE BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL: AUTOMATIC 
RATHER THAN EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION 
The recommendation of the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws of the United States 86 represents a third mode 87 of im- 
plementing the principles of Truth, Respect, and Evenhandedness, 
that is, a system of preventive rules that penalizes whole cate- 
gories of transactions without subjecting either each particular 
transfer or a whole series of them to scrutiny. The Commission's 
proposal, which appears in two sweeping bankruptcy bills put 
83 See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE 
FINANCE 393-95 (I972). Since thin capitalization and the payment of rather ordin- 
ary interest rates to outside creditors apparently go together in the undercapitaliza- 
tion cases, it is not surprising that courts have not engaged in the analytical exer- 
cise of separating out the legal force, if any, of mere thinness of capitalization 
from the consequences of thin capitalization in a context suggesting unfairness 
of one sort or another. 
84 See discussion of Walkovszky v. Carlton at pp. 550-53. 
85 The theme is explored more deeply in that part because there are many 
more true inadequate capitalization cases decided under the veil-piercing theory. 
86 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 115 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT]. 
87 See p. 517 supra. 
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before Congress,88 would automatically subordinate any claim of 
controlling shareholders to those of other creditors.8' 
From the analysis in the previous section, one can conclude 
that the device of equitable subordination serves a useful function 
in bankruptcy administration, at least when it is restricted to 
88H.R. 3I, S. 236, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (I975) (Bankruptcy Commission's 
bill); H.R. 32, S. 235, 94th Cong., ist Scss. (I975) (bankruptcy judges' bill). 
89 Section 4-406. Subordination of Claims. 
(a) Subordinated Classes of Claims. The following claims are subordinated 
in payment to all other nonsubordinated but allowable claims: 
* * * 
(2) any claim, whether secured or unsecured, of any principal officer, di- 
rector, or affiliate [defined in ? I-I02(4) to mean, inter alia, a shareholder 
controlling 20 per cent or more of the voting securities] of the debtor, 
or of any member of the immediate family of such officer, director, or 
affiliate; .... 
The Bankruptcy Commission's Report contains no discussion or justification of 
this proposed change. See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 86, at 116. 
Some case law experimented with automatic subordination. In re V. Loewer's 
Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J.) held that where 
the stockholders of a realty company and a brewing company were the same and 
held stock in the same proportions, the realty company's loans to the bankrupt 
brewing company would be subordinated to other claims, on the ground that in 
such a situation unfairness could easily occur and yet be so easily concealed that 
no scrutiny by the court would uncover it. In effect, the court in its decision opted 
for automatic subordination of controlling party claims, relying on the theory 
that the controlling parties can be presumed to have made fraudulent conveyances 
to themselves. The theory of automatic subordination was rejected over Judge 
Frank's dissent in Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. I95I), where the 
majority described in Loewer's holding as "not stated as an absolute rule of law," 
id. at 729. Interestingly, the court mentioned that the petitioner "has given no 
hint even of fraudulent conveyance, manufactured claim, or mismanagement," 
id. at 729; this is one of the rare suggestions of judicial awareness of the connec- 
tion between fraudulent conveyance law and equitable subordination. In the wake 
of Comstock, Judge Frank himself finally acceded- most grudgingly-to the 
rejection of a rule of automatic subordination of parent company claims in Gannett 
Co. v. Larry, 221 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. I955). There a publishing company, Gannett, 
acquired Berwin, a financially profitable manufacturer of paper products, and, fear- 
ing a newsprint shortage because of the Korean War, converted Berwin's facilities 
to the production of newsprint. The shortage did not materialize and Berwin, 
apparently being less efficient than regular newsprint producers, failed. Id. at 269- 
70, 272. Gannett's claims were subordinated. Judge Frank held that under the 
circumstances, "proof of fraud or illegality [was] not necessary"; it being sufficient 
that Gannett "pursued solely its own interests in its management of Berwin," 
since a newsprint supply was of interest to Gannett whether or not it was financially 
profitable to Berwin. Id. at 275. Judge Frank might better have justified his 
niggardly concession to the Supreme Court precedents by noting that Gannett's 
wanting to assure a source of supply would hardly make sense except on the as- 
sumption that in the expected period of shortage Gannett would not pay Berwin 
the large scarcity premium for newsprint which its then true market value would 
warrant - that is, on the assumption that Gannett would cause unfair transfers 
to itself which might, if accompanied by a threat to solvency or capital adequacy, 
amount to fraudulent conveyances. As it stands, Judge Frank's opinion makes 
equitable subordination a substitute for an action based on waste. 
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situations where the balance of the equities points to a holistic 
rather than a particularized analysis of pre-bankruptcy dealings 
with a corporate bankrupt. The justification for transmuting the 
doctrine into a rule of automatic subordination of insiders' claims 
would have to be that the possibilities for insiders to violate the 
ideals of Nonhindrance by fraudulent and preferential transac- 
tions with their corporation are so manifold, so difficult to discover 
and prove, and so tempting and likely to occur, that it is better 
not to burden the trustee in bankruptcy, and the outside creditors 
he represents, with the costs of a doctrine whose uncertainties 
invite litigation. 
On the other hand, a preventive rule that insiders' debt claims 
are subordinated automatically to those of outsiders may be 
objectionable because it appears unjust as applied to those in- 
siders who do in fact deal honestly, fairly, and nonpreferentially 
with their corporations. Indeed, there are compelling arguments 
which suggest that insiders be allowed to participate in their 
corporations as creditors on the same basis as outsiders. Con- 
trolling insiders, like other investors, should be free to have a 
portfolio of debt and equity securities so balanced as to meet 
their risk-return preferences. An investor should not be required 
to possess, in effect, only the status of a shareholder. The answer 
to this argument, of course, is that the capital markets of the 
United States are so richly diverse that a knowledgeable in- 
vestor can surely create a portfolio consisting of stock in his 
controlled corporation and debt or equity securities of unrelated 
entities that will have the same risk-return characteristics as 
a given portfolio of stock and debt in his controlled corporation. 
Another argument urged against an automatic subordination 
rule is that controlling shareholders are frequently-so it is 
said -the only persons willing to lend to a small, unknown 
corporation on "reasonable" terms. It is contended that if the 
insiders' creditor claim is not respected in bankruptcy, this source 
of funds may dry up and result in such small businesses' being 
deprived of the tax benefits of debt financing.90 
The force of this argument is uncertain because it ultimately 
rests on unproven empirical assertions concerning the conduct 
of controlling insiders 91 and the magnitude of transaction costs 
involved in assessing and communicating risks of default on 
90Interest payments by a corporation are generally deductible for federal 
income tax purposes. I.R.C. ? i63. Dividend payments are normally not. See 
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE- 
HOLDERS, IT 5.03, at 5-8 (3d ed. I97I). 
91 Controlling insiders may continue to lend because they are unaware of auto- 
matic subordination or because the corporation has no other creditors to whom 
they can be subordinated. 
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particular loans. If rational and disinterested outside lenders are 
unwilling to supply corporate "loans" on a given set of interest 
rates and other terms, the most natural conclusion is that a "loan" 
of that character would be made only by persons who, by virtue 
of concurrent stock ownership, could benefit from the inadequacy 
of the terms, and the "loans" to insiders should thus be treated 
like equity in distributing the bankrupt estate. True, situations 
may arise in which insiders (a) really do perceive more ac- 
curately that the "true" risk presented by a loan to a corporation 
on given terms is lower than outsiders recognize, and (b) are 
unable to articulate and convey the objective bases of their 
superior judgment to the prospective outside lenders at a reason- 
able cost. But, in view of the widespread belief in the general 
efficiency of our capital markets, one might well be agnostic about 
the notion that such situations are common. In short, objections 
to the Bankruptcy Commission's proposal based on the just 
demands of small investors and small businessmen are of doubtful 
validity. 
Nevertheless, the advantages of preventive rules must be 
viewed in a similarly agnostic fashion. One simply does not 
know the extent to which insiders who are also creditors abuse 
their controlling status by dealing dishonestly, unfairly, or 
preferentially with their corporations, to the detriment of out- 
side creditors. Without such knowledge, the benefits to be ex- 
pected from the automatic subordination rule are conjectural. 
This being so, a conservative adherence to equitable subordina- 
tion is certainly defensible. 
Furthermore, the automatic subordination rule imperfectly 
implements the normative ideals of fraudulent conveyance law. 
If the proposal were enacted, it would not always lead to an ade- 
quate correction of unfair transactions according to these prin- 
ciples. As with the application of equitable subordination doc- 
trine, a controlling insider who does not have a creditor claim 
against his corporation may have reaped unfair advantage from 
transactions with his corporation and yet not be affected by ap- 
plication of the automatic subordination rule. However, any de- 
tectable inadequacies in the correction of unfair dealings by in- 
siders might still be made up for by the more costly fraudulent 
conveyance action,92 for the recommendation does not preclude a 
92 This relatively heavier procedural burden may be lessened under the 
Proposed Bankruptcy Act. The Bankruptcy Commission would substantially abolish 
the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction and would make most 
controversies arising out of a bankruptcy proceeding subject to the jurisdiction 
of the bankruptcy court. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 86, at 
30-33 (? 2-20I of proposed act and note thereto). The impact of this change may 
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complementary claim on fraudulent conveyance grounds against 
insiders.93 On the other hand, automatic subordination might lead 
to overcorrection by subordinating an insider's claims in the ab- 
sence of a violation of the ideals. This result, however, is necessi- 
tated by the decision to sacrifice analytical and remedial precision 
for the certainty and ease of preventive rules. 
IV. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND 
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
This part will examine a branch of law which mixes considera- 
tion of the ideals of Nonhindrance with other policies that warrant 
comparative analysis in light of those ideals. The doctrines pre- 
viously discussed were different ways of implementing the same 
basic ideals, although some expansions of substantive elements 
were involved. We now turn to a doctrine that appears to go fur- 
ther toward an evolution of the ideals themselves. 
As a gloss on state corporation statutes, state and federal 
courts have developed a sizable body of case law dealing with the 
attempts of corporate creditors to satisfy their claims out of the 
personal assets of the corporation's shareholders despite the gen- 
eral rule of limited liability.94 Cases of this sort have been re- 
ferred to by various metaphors, such as "alter ego" or "instru- 
mentality" cases and attempts "to pierce the corporate veil." 9 
be diminished somewhat by the new venue rules. Id. at 36-41 (? 2-203 and note 
thereto). 
93 Provable fraudulent transfers not corrected by the automatic subordination 
of the insider's claims will have occurred in transactions separate from those that 
led to creation of the claims. It will therefore be easy to find that the subordination 
does not preclude a fraudulent conveyance recovery against the insider. If the 
events leading to the creation of the subordinated claim were not themselves 
fraudulent, the effect will be that the insider is punished, since he will get no "credit" 
for the amount returned in the fraudulent conveyance proceeding. But a punitive 
result is always a possibility under the rule of automatic subordination. 
4 Discussions of the case law are numerous. Among the more interesting 
treatments, drawn from different time periods, are I. WORMSER, DISREGARD OF 
THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1927); Berle, The 
Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947); Horowitz, Disregard- 
ing the Entity of Private Corporations, 14 WASH. L. REV. 285 (1939); Landers II, 
supra note 2; Landers I, supra note 2; Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of 
Legal Problems, 34 MICH. L. REV. 597 (1936); Posner, supra note 2; Comment, 
Alternative Methods of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 
48 B.U. L. REV. 123 (1968); Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Sub- 
sidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1958). 
95 See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 
585 (1966) ("instrumentality"); Goldberg v. Engleberg, 34 Cal. App. 2d IO, 92 
P.2d 935 (1939) ("piercing corporate veil"). See also commentary cited in note 
94 supra. 
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Though behavior which certainly would invoke fraudulent convey- 
ance law often triggers these cases, courts typically ignore the 
relationships between that body of law and the attempts to 
pierce.96 Moreover, they usually forego any sustained attempt at 
a remedial theory or even a coherent exposition of the basis of 
liability, although descriptive summaries are occasionally at- 
tempted.97 There is also a fair amount of reference in these cases 
to cases invoking the doctrine of equitable subordination, though 
careful analysis of the relationships between that doctrine and the 
instrumentality or alter ego rules is inevitably lacking. 
Indeed, cases attempting to pierce the corporate veil are uni- 
fied more by the remedy sought - subjecting to corporate liabil- 
ities the personal assets directly held by shareholders - than by 
repeated and consistent application of the same criteria for grant- 
ing the remedy. In particular, the cases revolve not only around 
96 See, e.g., Maryland ex rel. Goralski v. General Stevedoring Co., 213 F. 51, 
72-79 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland ex rel. 
Goralski, 2I9 F.827 (4th Cir. 1914) (subsidiary had small capital stock and parent 
took profits of business as a management charge that was apparently unfair); 
Goldberg v. Engelberg, 34 Cal. App. 2d 10, 92 P. 2d 935 (1939) (piercing from 
behind: creditor of dominant stockholder reaches corporate assets where stock- 
holder, after judgment was rendered against him, had deeded ranch to wife for 
"love and affection," and wife had later deeded it to corporation); Bartle v. 
Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. Io3, Io7-08, I27 N.E. 2d 832, 834 (I955) 
(dissent) (parent cooperative organized building subsidiary with small capital 
and caused it to sell homes to parent's members at prices designed to yield no 
profit to subsidiary; prices presumably unfair to creditors). 
An example of the technique of attempting to convert equity to debt in the 
context of a bootstrap acquisition is given by World Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Bass, i60 Tex. 261, 328 S.W.2d 863 (I959), where shareholders sold their stock 
for cash and a $67,500 installment note. The note was secured by a mortgage on the 
corporation's assets and by a promise by the purchaser to dissolve the corporation. 
The court, not even mentioning fraudulent conveyance law, held that, since the 
selling stockholders had thus denuded the corporation of its assets, they were 
personally liable to its creditors to the extent of the funds received. Quite similar 
factual patterns were presented in Steph v. Branch, discussed in note 14 supra, 
and in In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., discussed in note 62 supra, but in the former 
the court explicitly invoked fraudulent conveyance rules and in the latter it 
partially invoked equitable subordination. 
97 It has been said that in order to make a parent corporation responsible for 
the acts of a subsidiary corporation under the "instrumentality" rule, there must be, 
in the absence of express agency, estoppel, or direct tort, three proven elements: 
(i) control of the subsidiary by the parent; (2) use of control by the parent to 
commit fraud or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of legal rights, or to 
perpetrate a violation of statutory or other positive duty; and (3) proximate 
causation of plaintiff's injury or loss by the controlling party's breach of duty. 
See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 23I, 238 (2d Cir. I960); Zaist v. Olson, 
154 Conn. 563, 575, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (I967). The tripartite breakdown can be 
traced at least back to F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 4-6 
(I93I). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:28:26 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
542 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:505 
violations of the ideals of Nonhindrance but frequently around 
violations of an alleged policy that corporations should be ade- 
quately or reasonably capitalized.9 After comparing this policy 
with the ideals of Nonhindrance, the remedy in the veil-piercing 
cases (hereinafter, the piercing cases) will be contrasted with 
those afforded in fraudulent conveyance cases and in equitable 
subordination cases. Finally, a leading case will be analyzed to 
show how the policies are mixed and treated in actual litigation. 
A. From Nonhindrance to Cooperation: The Relevance 
of Inadequate Initial Capitalization. 
The ideals of Nonhindrance are clearly involved in piercing 
cases when the remedy is granted because of an unfair transfer. 
98 Richard Posner's recent article on veil-piercing and equitable subordination 
seems to me to focus almost exclusively on the problem of adequacy of initial 
capitalization, and to constitute an elaboration and justification, in terms of micro- 
economic theory, of what I call the standard initial response to the problem. 
Posner brings his law-and-economics machinery to bear on the problem and makes 
an unusually refined and sustained defense of this type of response. See Posner, 
supra note 2. 
By contrast, the problem of coping with the possibility that the corporation 
will take steps to increase the riskiness of the loan (by a contract creditor) after 
the terms have been set, which Posner calls the problem of supervision, are given 
relatively little attention. These problems of supervision are largely problems that 
lawyers have traditionally perceived to fall within the province of fraudulent 
conveyance law. 
As the succeeding discussion in the text will make clear, I prefer to analyze the 
problem of inadequate capitalization more in terms of moral categories than in 
relation to economic ones. In general, though I find Posner's analysis complemen- 
tary rather than objectionable, I have two reasons for not adopting his emphasis. 
First, his elaborate arguments seem to me to be directed towards propositions which, 
in their essence, have been accepted by judges for decades. Those courts which 
have dealt with true inadequate initial capitalization situations have generally 
accepted Posner's basically conservative stance when contract creditors who ought 
to have been self-informed were involved, see note 82 supra, but have had no 
problem with giving better treatment to widows of deceased employees and others 
who might be expected to receive boons, whether in the name of mercy or "exces- 
sive transaction costs." See notes Ioo & I04 infra. To be sure, Posner was direct- 
ing his efforts, not against the case law but against Landers, who had proposed 
what amounts to an automatic veil-piercing rule as well as an automatic subordina- 
tion rule. 
My second difficulty is that the courts have generally been struggling, not with 
the relatively academic issue of adequate initial capitalization, but with the wide- 
spread phenomenon of selfdealing on the eve of insolvency. This is often so even 
when courts mention inadequate capitalization as a basis for decision. See notes 
63, 82 supra. As is often said, a fraudulent conveyance is but the reflex of an 
insolvent man. It strikes me as insuperably difficult to read and ponder a good 
sampling of the case law classified under the headings of equitable subordination 
and veil-piercing, and then to fail to concede that fraudulent transfers and obliga- 
tions have been the focus of litigation and legal doctrine. I would suggest, there- 
fore, that they also be the focus of commentary. 
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Usually, if the outside creditor had knowledge of specific unfair 
transfers, he would simply bring a fraudulent conveyance action 
instead of a piercing suit, or would add a fraudulent conveyance 
count to his complaint in the piercing suit. However, unfair trans- 
fers are occasionally involved in piercing suits without being ex- 
plicitly analyzed as such or related to fraudulent conveyance law.99 
The reason is similar to that which accounts for some of the equit- 
able subordination cases. The number of unfair transactions with 
insiders may be large and indefinite, and proof of unfairness and 
the extent of lack of fair consideration in each instance of a trans- 
action may be difficult or extremely costly. 
The degree of involvement of the debtor's moral duties to 
creditors in the piercing cases is puzzling because of the presence 
of cases centering upon thinly capitalized corporations. Such 
cases, which involve a failure to supply adequate capital to a new 
corporation, are obviously difficult to explain in terms of strict 
fraudulent conveyance rules, which concern transfers made and 
obligations incurred. But they are also difficult to explain in rela- 
tion to the ideals of Nonhindrance. 
First, corporations are often attacked as having been inade- 
quately capitalized in situations in which there was no outright 
deception practiced on creditors and, thus, no violation of the 
normative ideal of Truth.100 Tort creditors frequently will not 
have relied on the corporation's level of capitalization and thus 
could not claim to have been deceived in a relevant way. In the ab- 
sence of affirmatively deceitful representations one is first tempted 
to remit contract creditors to their own diligence in obtaining and 
digesting relevant financial information from the corporations 
with which they deal. However, when the creditors are in a weak 
bargaining position, for example, small shippers claiming damages 
for breach of contract against a carrier, or where the complex of 
interrelated corporations is such that ordinary customers or cred- 
itors of one member of the complex might naturally be lulled into 
thinking that more assets were behind the contract or loan than 
the balance sheet of that member later shows, the courts have oc- 
casionally pierced the veil in favor of those customers or creditors. 
99 See note 96 supra. 
100 This is obviously true in most of the cases in which tort victims seek to 
pierce the corporate veil. On the other hand, in many cases involving contract 
creditors dealing with an undercapitalized member of an affiliated group of 
corporations, or with a corporation whose affairs are merged with those of the dom- 
inant stockholder, the courts seem quite influenced by the possibility that the 
creditor was misled into trusting some person or group other than the corporation 
per se, or was at least confused. See, e.g., Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & 
Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 
(2d Cir. 1960) (dictum). 
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This interference with the ostensibly consensual arrangements is 
based on a perception of unequal bargaining power or a kind of 
"soft-core" fraud, which is something approaching a violation of 
the principle of Truth. 
Second, the normative ideal of Respect suffers from uncer- 
tainty about its relevance and feasibility in the inadequate initial 
capitalization cases. Such cases differ significantly from gratuitous 
or unfair transfers from an insolvent but once adequately capi- 
talized business.101 In the latter situation, every contract creditor 
has a fundamental right to expect that such transfers will not be 
made, and treating this right as a ground rule that need not be 
expressed undoubtedly cuts down bargaining costs. Moreover, 
although fraudulent conveyance law forbids gratuitous or unfair 
transfers by a business debtor when the transferor would be left 
with an "unreasonably small capital," this rule is probably best 
thought of as a supplementary expression of the principle of Re- 
spect: the flexible concept of unreasonably small capital, which 
relates to insolvency in its pragmatic meaning, that is, inability to 
pay creditors, guarantees that mechanical balance-sheet tests of 
insolvency, which can be arbitrary and misleading, do not vitiate 
the ideal. Thin initial capitalization is a different matter. It is 
not so clear that Respect requires that a debtor so capitalize and 
run his corporate business that it will not raise the risk of failure 
to outside creditors beyond a certain maximum permissible level. 
This conclusion is resisted for various reasons. As to contract 
creditors, fundamental rights and expectations are hard to come 
by, for the parties can and often do bargain about the allocation 
of risks and the compensation for bearing them.102 And bargain- 
ing is generally thought to result in an equal or better allocation 
of resources than would a flat legal rule - if, indeed, the latter 
were to have any long-term impact that the parties could not bar- 
gain away.103 As to unsatisfied tort creditors and the desire to 
provide for their compensation, alternatives better than veil- 
piercing may exist.104 
104 See pp. 509-II supra. 
102 Cf. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. I960) (under- 
capitalization per se not sufficient reason for disregarding separate corporate exis- 
tence; appellants were contract creditors). 
103 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. I (I960). 
104 See note 123 infra. This is not to deny that, where the need for redress is 
great, of course, a court may well consider the possibility of better, alternative 
compensation schemes to be academic, and, on something like a theory of the 
second best, to permit recovery. See, e.g., Dixie Coal Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 
221 Ala. 33I, i28 So. 799 (1930) (veil of shell corporation pierced for benefit of 
widow and six dependent children of employee killed in the course of the company's 
mining operations). The author applauds such decisions. 
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Third, the ideal of Evenhandedness could be said to be in- 
volved in many inadequate initial capitalization cases in an in- 
direct way. The corporation could be characterized as having 
been organized so as to maintain a higher probability of satisfy- 
ing the claims of some creditors - those who investigated the 
corporation's financial situation before lending and took precau- 
tionary measures, such as perfected security interests - than of 
satisfying the claims of other creditors - tort creditors and con- 
tract creditors, such as small trade creditors, who made weaker 
credit checks. While this state of affairs could realistically be de- 
scribed as operating in a manner "preferential" to some creditors, 
several points suggest that application of the ideal of Evenhanded- 
ness in actual legal proceedings will be somewhat awkward and 
hesitant. Conventional preferences often involve an intent of the 
debtor to favor one creditor over others or a conscious effort by 
one creditor on the eve of insolvency or bankruptcy to grab pay- 
ment or security before the other creditors do,l05 whereas inade- 
quate capitalization usually results from neither of these motiva- 
tions. More seriously, there is apparently no accepted theoretical 
model for determining when a mode of doing business unfairly 
raises the probability of satisfying one unsecured creditor so high 
relative to the probability of satisfying another unsecured creditor 
that some drastic legal remedy such as equitable subordination or 
piercing the corporate veil ought to be invoked.l10 Furthermore, 
the differences in probabilities of satisfaction of sophisticated, 
bargaining creditors and satisfication of tort or trade creditors 
could vary greatly, depending on the extent of capital inadequacy 
and other factors. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to de- 
termine what is the minimum "probability difference" that will 
justify piercing the corporate veil.107 
105 See I BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 86, at 202-04, 206-Io 
(I973). It is difficult to understand the special treatment of "floating liens" on 
personal property except by reference to the usual absence in the immediate pre- 
bankruptcy period of preferential intent on the part of the bankrupt and over- 
reaching intent on the part of the creditor. 
106 Not just the decision to capitalize thinly, but other business decisions could 
cause this divergence of probabilities of satisfaction. For instance, the decision 
to settle all customer claims quickly and without dispute, rather than to fight and 
delay them, could result in a relatively small number of such claimants being sub- 
jected to the meager payout of straight bankruptcy. Are all such decisions to 
be a basis for piercing the corporate veil in favor of the relatively disadvantaged 
creditors? Why restrict relief to the decision to put in lesser capital than that 
needed to reduce such divergences? 
107 A clear theoretical basis for fleshing out Ballantine's call for a requirement of 
capital "reasonably adequate for [the corporation's] prospective liabilities," H. 
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 303 (rev. ed. I946), might be developed along the lines 
of Learned Hand's famous formula for determining when a defendant in a negli- 
gence case acted as a reasonable man. 
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In summary, in those piercing cases which are not substitutes 
for fraudulent conveyance actions but which genuinely turn upon 
inadequate initial capitalization, the ideals of Truth, Respect, 
Hand contended that the amount of care "demanded of a person by an oc- 
casion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure 
others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against 
the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk." Conway v. O'Brien, III 
F.2d 6II, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (I94I). Judge 
Hand later restated this thought in algebraic terms: "if the probability be called P; 
the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L 
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B<PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., I59 
F.2d 169, I73 (2d Cir. I947). The formula can be criticized in many ways-for 
example, for not taking into account whether plaintiff could have incurred some 
burden B' that would have avoided the risk more cheaply than B (the problem 
of comparative negligence) -but it can serve as a useful starting framework of 
analysis. 
The formula, with the elements construed in marginal terms, can be transferred 
to the capital adequacy context. B can represent the discounted present value of 
the cost of an additional increment of equity capital; L, the losses that would be 
suffered by contract and tort creditors if the corporation were to fail; P, that 
portion of the probability of failure that would be eliminated by supplying the 
additional increment of equity capital to the corporation; and PL would be dis- 
counted to present value. Whether the veil would be pierced would depend on 
whether B<PL. To give corporations incentives to obey the rule, the remedy upon 
successful piercing would be corporate liability for L. Liability merely for B - 
the cost that the corporation and its stockholders "should have incurred" but didn't 
- would be inadequate because it would give stockholders an incentive to gamble on 
the possibility that no liability would ever materialize. 
An argument can be made that in certain contexts imposition of veil-piercing 
liability is pointless. Consider Lender, a rational contract creditor who actually 
bargains with the corporation. B is less than PL, and Lender's own cost of elimina- 
ting the risk PL is greater than PL. To take figures, B is $75 and PL is $Ioo. 
Lender will be willing to pay the corporation or its stockholders any amount short 
of $Ioo, e.g., by charging a lower interest rate, to have them maintain, supply, or 
obtain at cost B the incremental capital necessary to eliminate the incremental 
risk. The promise thus paid for might be embodied in loan agreement covenants re- 
lating to dividends, financial ratios, the nature of permitted other liabilities, and the 
like. In sum, failure of the legal system to impose liability on the stockholders for 
failure to supply the increment of equity capital need not mean that it will not be 
supplied. See Coase, supra note 103. Commentators have this insight in mind 
when they say that, in the absence of fraud (deception), the corporate veil should 
not be pierced on behalf of contract creditors merely because of inadequate capital. 
When information and transaction costs make the bargaining strategy unfeasible, 
then the legal system might prudently impose liability on the corporate share- 
holders if it is determined that they, more cheaply than the affected creditors, can 
avoid the incremental risk PL, and if various other guidelines are met. See G. 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS I35-75 (1970). Such perceptions may be 
behind the cases which allow piercing in favor of tort creditors, trade creditors, 
and creditors who became such as consumers whose contracts were breached. 
An analytically rigorous approach to the problem need not be justified on the 
ground that it would lead to precise, objective, and actually usable tests of capital 
adequacy - it probably would not - but may be justified as a tool for encourag- 
ing systematic consideration by judges of all relevant considerations and their 
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and Evenhandedness, or the more general ideal of Nonhindrance, 
are often implicated weakly or not at all. Moreover, when impli- 
cated they may nevertheless be stifled by the apparent unavail- 
ability of a satisfactory and practically feasible rule of imple- 
mentation. Thus, some of the piercing cases can be interpreted as 
expanding the ideals of Nonhindrance to a new ideal of affirmative 
support of creditors' interests through the requirement of an ade- 
quate capital structure. Put another way, the thin capitalization 
cases have experimented with the notion of placing upon business 
creditors an affirmative duty of cooperation with creditors. As 
the ambivalence and conflict in the case law suggest, the experi- 
ment is certainly not completed. 
B. Comparison of Remedies 
The piercing cases appear to employ a shotgun remedy, that 
is, a remedy less precisely responsive than those invoked in fraud- 
ulent conveyance cases, but one more biased toward a punitive 
result than those invoked by the doctrine of equitable subordina- 
tion. When not ignoring the question of the scope of the relief 
completely, courts in piercing cases often assume either that the 
proper remedy is simply the complete revocation of limited lia- 
bility. One obvious alternative, where state decisional law recog- 
nizes the inadequate capitalization theory,'08 is that the recovery 
be limited to the amount of the inadequacy of the capitalization. 
But affirmatively responding to a plaintiff's requests to pierce the 
veil in either of these ways may fail to compensate completely 
outside creditors for harm wrongfully caused them if the personal 
assets of the defendants are insufficient to fill the need. Of course, 
this possibility is also present in a fraudulent conveyance action. 
On the other hand, if the personal assets of the defendants exceed 
either the amount of funds improperly transferred to them from 
the corporation or the size of the inadequacy of the corporation's 
capitalization, piercing the veil and imposing liability to the full 
interrelationships. Analytical schemes, even if no better than common sense and 
experience for understanding and predicting empirical realities, often may serve 
the insurance function of preventing loss of perspective. 
108 Unlike the New York courts, the California courts have emphasized the 
importance of inadequate capitalization. See e.g., Automotriz del Golfo de Cali- 
fornia S.A. de C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 306 P.2d i (I957); Minton v. Cavaney, 
56 Cal. 2d 549, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961). These cases relied heavily on 
Ballantine's rather optimistic reading of prior cases: "It is coming to be recog- 
nized as the policy of the law that shareholders should in good faith put at the 
risk of the business unincumbered capital reasonably adequate for its prospective 
liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be 
done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate entity privi- 
lege." H. BALLANTINE, supra note 107, at 303. 
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extent of their personal assets will overcompensate the creditors 
for the harm traceable to the defendants' provable or wrongful 
acts. This result has the effect of penalizing the defendants.'09 
A few examples may show how this punitive bias differs from 
the remedial imprecision of equitable subordination doctrine. As- 
sume that M corporation has assets of $Ioo and an outside 
creditor claim of $I50. The controlling shareholder is chargeable 
with some acts or omissions that, properly conceptualized, will 
trigger the doctrine of equitable subordination as well as that of 
piercing the corporate veil. Assume first that the controlling 
shareholder has no legitimate creditor claim against M, but owns 
nonexempt personal assets worth $50. If M is placed into straight 
bankruptcy and the trustee in bankruptcy raises no objections, the 
outside creditor receives $Ioo, which is all of the assets. Even 
if the trustee could successfully invoke equitable subordination 
and the interpretation of that doctrine as calling regularly for full 
subordination of the total creditor claims of the controlling party, 
he would not improve the proceeds available for the outside credi- 
tor. On the other hand, if M had not gone into bankruptcy and 
the outside creditor simply sued M, the outside creditor would 
also receive $Ioo. But if he were to pierce the corporate veil suc- 
cessfully, he would reap an additional $50 satisfaction of his claim. 
The extra $50 recovery might conceivably put him in a position 
which matched the result that would have occurred had the con- 
trolling shareholder not engaged in the wrongful conduct, though 
his position might just as well be better or worse than the result. 
In any event, he fares better than he would if only equitable sub- 
ordination were invoked on his behalf. 
If the controlling shareholder's posture is reversed - if he is 
assumed to be asset-poor but possessed of a large legitimate credi- 
tor claim against his corporation - the result for the outside 
creditor under the two doctrines is not the opposite of that de- 
scribed in the preceding paragraph. Assume, for instance, that 
the shareholder in the above example had a legitimate creditor 
claim against the corporation of $50 but no (other) nonexempt 
personal assets. If M went into bankruptcy and the trustee did 
not object to the shareholder's creditor claim, the outside creditor 
09 A better remedy would be recovery of the amount of harm proximately 
caused to outside creditors by the relevant misbehavior of the controlling share- 
holder, whether it was failure to capitalize adequately, wasteful management, or 
self-dealing and confusion of roles. To be sure, the notion of proximate causa- 
tion is itself perplexing' and largely functional in its orientation, see Calabresi, Con- 
cerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. 
L. REV. 69 (I975), but it certainly suggests more accurately the remedial path to 
be taken in piercing cases than do the other alternatives. 
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would receive I50/200 of the assets, or $75. If equitable subordi- 
nation were successfully invoked, he would receive $Ioo. 
In contrast to the role of equitable subordination in the exam- 
ple discussed in the previous paragraph, that doctrine now does 
better his recovery. Yet it does not follow that the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil will now yield a worse recovery. With- 
out the doctrine, and absent a bankruptcy, the outside creditor's 
recovery in a suit against M will depend on a number of factors: 
if the outside creditor wins the "race of diligence" under state law 
concerning collection remedies, as by being the first to get a judg- 
ment or execution lien on M's property, then the outside creditor 
will recover $Ioo; if the shareholder qua creditor wins the race, 
however, the outside creditor will recover only $50; if there is no 
race and an assignment for the benefit of creditors is made, both 
may share pro rata, so that the outside creditor receives $75. If, 
however, the outside creditor sues M and also successfully pierces 
the corporate veil, he will have access to the shareholder's personal 
assets. By hypothesis, the latter's only asset is his claim against 
M. If, as may often be the case, that claim is not exempt from 
creditors' process (at least in a piercing case), then the outside 
creditor will get the benefit of the shareholder's claim, and thus 
recover $Ioo, the full amount of the assets of the corporation. 
Assuming, then, that the outside creditor who pierces the cor- 
porate veil can obtain not only the shareholder's ordinary personal 
assets but also any creditor claim of the shareholder against the 
corporation, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil will never 
yield a result less favorable to the creditor than equitable subordi- 
nation and may often yield a more favorable one. From the 
debtor's standpoint, of the two shotgun approaches to remedying 
the debtor's violation of his moral duties to creditors, piercing the 
corporate veil is more likely to yield a punitive result.10 
One further point concerns the availability rather than the 
nature of the piercing remedy. It is not likely that a trustee in 
bankruptcy could invoke the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil for the benefit of the unsecured creditors of the bankrupt 
estate of the corporation. The trustee's avoiding-powers under 
section 7oe,'1 which, roughly speaking, incorporates the state law 
rights of defrauded actual creditors of the bankrupt estate, depend 
on there being a fraudulent or voidable transfer. The trustee would 
need evidence of an unfair transfer and of the presence of a de- 
frauded actual creditor before trying to pierce the corporate veil 
110 This statement does not, of course, imply that punitive results are more 
or less frequent than undercorrective ones. The actual frequency is an empirical 
question. 11 II U.S.C. ? IIo(e) (I970). 
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under section 7oe; given such evidence, he might just as well bring 
a fraudulent conveyance action. Assuming the shareholders have 
not filed claims in the bankruptcy proceeding, either type of action 
would necessitate a plenary suit. He might prefer a piercing suit 
in order to impose a punitive recovery on the controlling party, 
but then he would run up against the common understanding that 
section 7oe is available for undoing fraudulent transfers, ard 
nothing more. Other avoiding-powers - the trustee's powers to 
undo preferences,112 certain judicial liens,113 certain statutory 
liens,114 and fraudulent conveyances,115 also depend on the 
presence of a transfer, and his possession of the rights of certain 
hypothetical creditors under section 7oc,116 though less clear in this 
respect generally will avail only to undo transfers.117 Thus, the 
trustee is practically remitted to a variety of remedies (including 
fraudulent conveyance suits and equitable subordination) in the 
case of unfair transfers, and to equitable subordination in inade- 
quate capitalization cases, but will rarely, if ever, invoke the 
piercing doctrine.118 
C. An Illustration 
A brief discussion of one of the better known piercing cases 
may illustrate the difficulties perceived by courts that think they 
are being asked to go beyond Nonhindrance to imposing on debtors 
an affirmative duty of cooperation with their creditors. In Wal- 
kovszky v. Carlton,119 a seriously injured tort victim of the em- 
ployee of a two-cab corporation carrying only the minimum 
amount of automobile liability insurance attempted to have lia- 
bility imposed on nine affiliated two-cab corporations and on their 
112 Bankruptcy Act ? 60, ii U.S.C. ? 96 (I970). 
113 Bankruptcy Act ? 67a, I U.S.C. ? Io7(a) (1970). 
114 Bankruptcy Act ? 67c, II U.S.C. ? Io7(c) (1970). 
11 Bankruptcy Act ? 67d, II U.S.C. ? Io7(d) (1970). 
116 Bankruptcy Act ? 7oc, ii U.S.C. ? IIo(c) (1970). 
117 See 4A J. MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, SEll 7o.55-7o.62A (specific types of 
transactions and interests attackable by trustee under ? 7oc). 
118 I have been unable to locate a case in which a trustee in bankruptcy success- 
fully sought to pierce the veil of the bankrupt corporation solely because of in- 
adequate initial capitalization. In one case, the court did allow the trustee to 
proceed under ? 7oc on a veil-piercing claim, but the facts show that the gist 
of the offense was an unfair transfer: the trustee alleged that the shareholders 
deposited corporation funds into their personal bank accounts. Long v. McGlon, 
263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967). The Long decision was, in my view, unwise, since 
it leads unnecessarily to substitution of an imprecise, punitively oriented remedy 
for the more rational one suggested by a fraudulent conveyance analysis. But see 
Landers I, supra note 2, at 606-i6, where an extended plea for giving trustees 
the right to pierce veils is made. Landers' analysis differs from mine in that he 
does not take fraudulent conveyance law as the basis for understanding the other 
doctrines discussed in this article. 
119 I8 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966). 
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common owner, Carlton. The victim had alleged that Carlton had 
systematically "milked" and "siphoned off" the profits of the 
corporation precisely for the purpose of minimizing the assets of 
the business that would be exposed to tort claims. The New York 
Court of Appeals appeared to rule that Walkovszky could succeed 
only on a "fraud" or an "agency" theory, neither of which he 
had alleged with sufficient particularity. The apparent negative 
implication was that a tort creditor in New York cannot pierce 
the corporate veil solely on grounds of inadequate capitalization. 
Since the court disposed of the alleged "milking" in a foot- 
note - without evident awareness of the relevance of fraudulent 
conveyance rules to the allegation - on the questionable grounds 
that it was premature and unspecific,'20 it is not clear just what 
Walkovszky could have alleged in particular to invoke the so- 
called fraud theory of piercing.121 Inadequate capitalization alone 
generally does not fall under the rubric of actual or constructive 
fraud. Moreover, violations of the principles of Truth or Respect 
are difficult to maintain in connection with inadequate initial 
capitalization.122 Though later withdrawals of profit might be 
argued to violate the principle of Respect, the court's footnote on 
the milking claim seems to reject this argument, at least as ap- 
plied to tort victims who were not such on the dates of withdrawal. 
One might be tempted to conclude, then, that the court's opin- 
ion amounts to a rejection of the piercing lawsuit in New York, 
leaving unfair transfers for fraudulent conveyance actions and 
inadequate capitalization for redress by the legislature, if at all.123 
120 Id. at 421 n.3, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 59I n.3, 223 N.E.2d at io n.3. The charge 
was thought premature because plaintiff was not yet a judgment creditor of the 
corporation. If he should become such, asserted the court, he might then sue 
under the dividend-restriction and similar rules of the business corporation statute. 
The court overlooked the possibility of suit under New York's version of the UFCA, 
it having been held long before that a prior judgment is not a procedural pre- 
requisite to suit under that statute. American Surety Co. v. Connor, 251 N.Y. I, 
I66 N.E. 783 (I929). (This has also been the consistent interpretation in other 
states of the UFCA. Note, Fraudulent Conveyances -Necessity of Judgment to 
Set Aside, II MONT. L. REV. 60 (I950); see 32 MICH. L. REV. 705 (I934). Further- 
more, New York fraudulent conveyance law has been applied to remedy milking 
and diversion of corporate assets, even where one of the devices was payment of 
dividends. United States v. 58th Street Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475, 
498 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
121 In fact, newly added allegations in Walkovszky's amended complaint were 
later held to state a cause of action, but on the theory that the individual defend- 
ants were really conducting business in their individual capacities--a theory 
which corresponds to the agency or instrumentality theory discussed in the text. 
Walkovszky v. Carlton, 29 A.D.2d 763, 287 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1968), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 
714, 244 N.E.2d 55, 296 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1968). 
122 See pp. 543-44 supra. 
123 If the legislature felt that tort victims needed greater protection against the 
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Such a conclusion would be unjustified, however, because of the 
curious permission of the court to invoke an "agency theory," 
that is, to attempt to prove that the corporation was merely an 
agent or "instrumentality" of the individual shareholder in the 
latter's carrying out of what was in reality his own business.124 
The function of the theory in practice is that of loosening up the 
level of proof and the atomistic nature of the analyses required 
in a fraudulent conveyance action explicitly denominated as such. 
Instead of focusing sharply on each dealing of the defendant cor- 
poration with its controlling shareholders and confronting di- 
vagaries of limited liability, it might require higher initial legal capital requirements 
for corporations and might impose capital maintenance rules as well. Alternatively, 
it might mandate the carrying of greater amounts of liability insurance than are 
presently required. Since either alternative, if imposed in the form of a universal 
requirement, might entail provision of excessive tort victim security in some lines 
of corporate business and inadequate provision in others, the requirements might 
have to be varied for types of business. To avoid the regulatory burden and 
probable clumsiness of such a scheme, a third alternative that the federal govern- 
ment might mandate would be requiring that contract creditors, including secured 
creditors, be automatically subordinated in insolvency proceedings to all tort credi- 
tors. Given such an absolute rule of subordination, the burden of prodding debtors 
into securing "adequate" capital or insurance to take care of tort victims would be 
shifted to those contract creditors, for example, outside lending institutions, who 
are in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the debtor, and the debtor and his 
creditors could arrange whatever amount of protection against tort victims was 
judged adequate for them. One suspects that such a rule, since it would create 
an incentive not only for controlling shareholders (who are typically small business- 
men willing to take high risks) but also for powerful and conservative outside 
parties, would have more impact on corporate practices than even an activist 
expansion of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Finally, a fourth alterna- 
tive might be to provide for tort victims in some way other than by increasing 
the likelihood of there being a person sufficiently solvent to make a defendant in 
a tort action. First-party compensation schemes such as no-fault insurance are 
an obvious example. If one focuses not on "tort creditors" generally, but on types 
of accidental injury problems - for example, the problem of automobile accidents - 
a scheme to lower the high transaction costs and spotty results associated with the 
fault system may well seem the preferable alternative. Thus, New York's enact- 
ment of a no-fault insurance law, N.Y. INS. LAW ?? 670-677 (Consol. 1975), consti- 
tutes, among many other things, a response to the problem of the two-cab corpora- 
tion - a response which may turn out to be better than reversal of the decision in 
Walkovszky. 
These remarks are not intended to pronounce definitively upon the substantive 
merits of the various alternatives to piercing the corporate veil, nor to imply that 
veil piercing for tort creditors may not be the ideal solution in a given context, 
under some theory of the second best. The point is that the presence and prima 
facie attractiveness of the alternatives make some courts unsure of piercing the veil 
in simple inadequate capitalization cases, even when the beneficiary would be a 
tort victim. 
124The permission derives perhaps from Justice Cardozo's attempt in Berkey 
v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) to substitute this mecha- 
nistic and opaque theory of liability for what he referred to as the "mists of meta- 
phor." See id. at 94, I55 N.E. at 61. 
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rectly the doctrinal arguments for and against making inadequate 
capitalization per se a basis for calling off limited liability, the 
court may find that random instances of self-dealing and mis- 
management, in the context of the shareholder's failure to keep 
corporate books and observe corporate formalities, his or its 
mingling of corporate and personal (or parent company) assets, 
and various other utterances and acts which suggest too weak a 
faith in the reality of the corporate fiction,125 is sufficient to make 
the shareholder unlimitedly liable. All of the latter kinds of "in- 
dicia" of agency - the inattention to formalities and the mingling 
of affairs and assets - are, upon analysis, singularly lacking in 
direct relevance to the question of the existence, and the amount, 
of harm caused the outside creditor by the misbehavior of the 
controlling shareholder. Yet these indicia do at least suggest that 
fraudulent transfers may have taken place, or that creditors jus- 
tifiably relied on the creditworthiness of the dominant stockholder 
or an affiliated corporation, and when sufficiently suffused with 
intimations and evidence of some actual self-dealing, may create 
the appearance of a justification for going beyond the limits im- 
posed by doctrine which would require atomistic analysis and a 
precise remedy. 
In summary, the agency theory enunciated in piercing cases 
serves a practical function similar to that of equitable subordina- 
tion doctrine, in that both avoid the perceived restraints of fraud- 
ulent conveyance law. Understandably, then, the piercing cases 
suppress mention of that body of law.l26 
125 See Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corpora- 
tions, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929); H. BALLANTINE, supra note Io7, ?? I23, I37, at 
294-95, 3I4-I5. 
126 It should also be mentioned that the technique of doctrinal suppression can 
be invoked not only to hurt but to help controlling shareholders, when the court 
feels for whatever reasons that the shareholders should be helped but might be 
unduly disadvantaged by an analysis in conventional fraudulent conveyance terms. 
A nice example is given by one of the major New York cases dealing with the 
attempt of contract creditors of a subsidiary corporation to pierce the corporate 
veils and obtain access to the assets of the parent corporation. In Bartle v. Home 
Owners Cooperative Inc., 309 N.Y. Io3, I27 N.E. 2d 832 (I955) the creditors of 
the subsidiary corporation, a company in the business of building homes that were 
to be sold to the parent company's shareholders (who were mostly veterans), 
claimed that the parent corporation had dominated the subsidiary and had run it 
not in the best interest of the subsidiary itself but for the interest of the parent 
and its shareholders. In an opinion that is far from satisfactory in its explanation 
or motivations, the court rejected this claim, which was a standard way of ex- 
pressing the agency theory. Most interestingly, it completely brushed over the 
fact that plaintiffs had alleged that the subsidiary had sold its homes at cost 
to the veterans, 309 N.Y. at 107, I27 N.E. 2d at 834 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) 
and thus ignored the very real possibilities that a fraudulent convevance action 
could be brought to set aside these sales, or to recover the excess of market value 
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V. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND DIVIDEND RESTRICTIONS 
The moral duties of the business debtor are also expressed in 
provisions of business corporation laws which restrict a corpora- 
tion's ability to pay dividends or to make other kinds of distribu- 
tions to its shareholders. While perhaps most corporate lawyers 
perceive a relationship between these restrictions and general 
fraudulent conveyance law principles,'7 there has been no close 
analysis of how this relationship may weaken the protection af- 
forded by fraudulent conveyance law. The topic bears some dis- 
cussion, not only because corporate distributions are of great eco- 
nomic significance, but also because these particular restraints 
raise the interesting general problem of the role of bright lines in 
corporate management. 
Under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),128 as 
well as the actual laws of many states,129 a corporate debtor may 
not make a transfer in the form of a distribution to shareholders 
- whether the distribution be a technical dividend,130 a distribu- 
tion out of capital surplus,'13 a share repurchase,132 or a redemp- 
tion 133 - if, just after the distribution, the corporation would be 
insolvent in the traditional equity sense of being unable to meet its 
debts as they become due.134 And, of course, a corporation in ac- 
tual dissolution must pay its creditors before distributing anything 
to shareholders.135 The existence of these overarching and not 
easily manipulable 136 restraints on corporate distributions is not 
over cost from the veterans, or to recover the excess amount from the parent 
corporation on the theory that it, as controlling party, was the fraudulent trans- 
feror or at least an aider and abettor. Had the court recognized these possibilities, 
it might have been forced to acknowledge that the case before it was in substance 
one seeking to recover from the parent as a fraudulent transferor and, therefore, 
the fact that the homes were to be sold at cost to the veterans was crucial. 
127 See, e.g., W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS I489-90 (4th 
ed. unabr. I969) (fraudulent conveyance rules are noted as "hav[ing] some bear- 
ing upon the avoidance of dividend payments," but are not explicitly compared and 
contrasted with statutory dividend restrictions). 
28 ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ?? 45, 46(a), 6, 66 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as MBCA]. 
129 E.g., N.Y. Bus CORP. LAW ?? 5Io(a), 513 (McKinney I963 & Supp. I976); 
CAL. CORP. CODE ? I50I, (West 1976 Supp.) (effective Jan. I, I977). 
130 See MBCA ? 45. 
131 See MBCA ? 46(a). 
132 See MBCA ? 6. 
133 See MBCA ? 66. 
134 See MBCA ? 2(n). 
135 See MBCA ?? 87(b), 98. 
136 There is no statutory procedure for shareholder action to avoid the insolv- 
ency test, as there is in the case of the prohibitions against dividends out of capital 
surplus or legal capital. 
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surprising, for they are a straightforward expression of fraud- 
ulent conveyance principles. Under the general fraudulent con- 
veyance principle of Respect for creditors, a debtor may not make 
a gratuitous or unfair transfer if, just after the transfer, he would 
be insolvent 13 in a modified balance sheet sense.13' The specific 
restraints on corporate distributions simply remove all doubts 
as to whether a distribution to shareholders is a "transfer without 
fair consideration" within the meaning of general fraudulent con- 
veyance law. 
However, the UFCA, as well as the Bankruptcy Act, go a sig- 
nificant step further in the protection they would give the creditors 
of business debtors. UFCA section 5 declares fraudulent any gra- 
tuitous or unfair transfer by a debtor in business if, after the trans- 
fer, the property remaining in the debtor's hands is "an unreason- 
ably small capital." 139 The debtor's post-transfer situation must 
be such that not only do his assets exceed his liabilities, but the 
amount of the excess - the debtor's net worth, or, in the loose 
usage of the statute,140 his "capital" - must not fall below some 
reasonable, minimum amount. What constitutes an adequate or 
reasonable amount of capital, either in general or for particular 
businesses, is not specified in the statute. Though one can hardly 
extract specific rules of thumb from the relevant case law,'4 one 
can at least conclude that the concept of capital is a flexible notion 
derived from all relevant facts and circumstances in a particular 
case. The thrust of the notion is a realistic and purposive one: the 
court must do its best to determine a level of capital which would 
provide a reasonable minimum level of protection against future 
decreases in the value of the debtor's assets and its subsequent 
inability to meet obligations to creditors. Obviously, creditor pro- 
tection against adverse developments is a matter of degree. While 
the theory of assessing and measuring the amount of protection 
provided by given capital levels could perhaps be elaborated and 
specified by management consultants or economists, the courts 
in practice must make very rough estimates of the degree of pro- 
tection afforded to creditors in a particular case. Moreover, the 
137 See UFCA ? 4. 
138 See UFCA ? 2. 
139 See also Bankruptcy Act ? 67d(2)(b), ii U.S.C. ? 0o7(a)(2) (b) (97o), 
which, unlike UFCA ? 5, also covers obligations incurred. 
140Neither the UFCA nor the Bankruptcy Act define what they mean by 
"capital" as it appears in the phrase "unreasonably small capital," but common 
sense suggests that it must mean something like "capital" as the phrase is used in 
discussions of commercial bank capital adequacy or of reasonable capital in veil- 
piercing cases. In other words, it has to do with net worth, not just legal capital. 
141 See cases cited in 4 J. MOORE ET. AL., supra note I, I 67.35, at 525 n. 8. 
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particular degree of protection legally required is a normative 
stipulation rather than an economic matter. 
General business corporation statutes usually contain a num- 
ber of restraints on distributions that are apparently based on the 
general notion that a business debtor ought to keep a minimal 
capital cushion in the business to protect its creditors. Under 
MBCA section 45(a), for example, dividends may only be paid 
out of "unreserved or unrestricted earned surplus," or put nega- 
tively, not out of legal capital 142 and capital surplus.113 Neverthe- 
less, one quickly discovers that the restraints are virtually mean- 
ingless, for two major reasons: first, because they can be avoided 
if proper statutory procedures are followed; second, because they 
are founded on formalistic accounting conventions rather than the 
UFCA's equity-oriented, purposive concept of capital, which is 
much more relevant to the question of risk actually posed to 
creditors. 
For instance, the corporate debtor without any earned surplus 
may, under MABCA section 46, avoid the restriction by making an 
ongoing "distribution" to shareholders out of capital surplus,144 
provided that either the articles of incorporation so provide or the 
shareholders vote to approve the distribution.145 Furthermore, if 
there is neither earned surplus nor capital surplus, the corporation 
may be able to invoke MBCA section 69 and obtain a shareholder 
vote to reduce its stated (legal) capital, thus generating an instant 
capital surplus from which distribution to shareholders can then 
be made pursuant to section 46.'46 Moreover, if the corporation 
had been prudent enough to incorporate in Delaware, it would be 
able, in effect, to pay dividends out of stated capital without any 
shareholder vote, if it could meet the requirements of the "nimble 
dividend" rule.147 In any event, even an effective prohibition 
against dividends out of legal capital provides only formalistic pro- 
tection, since a corporation may be formed with either no minimum 
142 See MBCA ? 2(j) (definition of "stated capital"). 
143 See MBCA ? 2(1), (m) (definitions of "earned surplus" and "capital sur- 
plus'). 
144See MBCA ? 46(e). 
145 See MBCA ? 46(b). 
146 To be sure, dividends out of reduction surplus can be partially defended on 
the ground that the voting requirement will slow things down and give some con- 
tract creditors a chance to adjust or to take protective measures, e.g., refusing to 
make further shipments unless paid for on delivery. Also, prudent institutional 
lenders will have already bargained for a limit on dividends except under condi- 
tions acceptable to them. 
147 Under that rule, if the corporation has net positive earnings for the cur- 
rent and immediately preceeding year taken together, it may pay dividends to 
that extent, even if it has no capital surplus and has inherited an overall earned 
surplus deficit which the current earnings have not eliminated. 
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capital,14 or only a trivial amount,149 and is not required to in- 
crease this amount as the business grows. Furthermore, in some 
states in which ordinary dividends may be paid out of surplus, the 
amounts shown as surplus may include revaluation surplus, that 
is, the increase in net worth as shown on the balance sheet which 
occurs when a corporation writes up assets to reflect what is be- 
lieved to be their real, but as yet unrealized, appreciation in value 
over their book value, or historical cost less depreciation."' 
The porosity of ordinary corporation law's barriers against 
outflows of a corporation's minimum cushion of capital for credi- 
tors and the use of irrelevant legal-accounting methods of com- 
puting the cushion have a number of consequences. First, except 
insofar as fair market value accounting impinges on the tradi- 
tional accounting tests, the statutory restrictions probably lead to 
less litigation than would a less mechanical test such as mainte- 
nance of a net worth reasonable in light of the nature of the par- 
ticular business and its liabilities. Dividend-restricting statutes 
are generally easier than fraudulent conveyance law for courts and 
shareholders to apply. 
However, other consequences of these statutes are less laud- 
able and derived from the slight protection provided by the re- 
straints. Most lenders to corporations, if at all sophisticated, do 
not rely on the statutory capital cushions. If it is worth their while 
to obtain protection beyond that afforded by the overarching in- 
solvency test, they will bargain to obtain security interests or 
protective provisions in their loan agreements containing more 
effective restrictions on dividends and other distributions. An- 
other consequence is that it is possible for tort creditors of a 
corporation to be adversely affected by the weak dividend re- 
straints of ordinary business corporation law. At the time a tort 
claim arises, the corporation's net worth, and even the assets avail- 
able for creditors who are not secured,151 may have fallen so low 
148 Neither Delaware nor New York has a minimum initial legal or stated 
capital requirement. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 140, I43 (1970). 
149 See id. at 2I4-I5. 
50 See, e.g., Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd without 
opinion, 262 App. Div. 844, 29 N.Y.S.2d 512 (ist Dept. 1941), aff'd with opinion, 
288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942). 
A similar situation to that governing dividends exists with respect to distributions 
in the form of stock repurchases and redemptions. 
151 In recent times, many bankruptcy lawyers have found that in an increas- 
ing number of cases in which the bankrupt has assets, almost all of them have been 
hypothecated to secured creditors. The facilitation of the creation, perfection, 
and enforcement of security interests in personal property by Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code may be partly responsible for this apparent trend. 
See Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoMm. L.J. 269 
(I976). 
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because of past dividend payments that the tort creditor's claim 
will not be satisfied to any significant degree.152 
Ordinary business corporation law's weak and arbitrary re- 
straints upon shareholder distributions force one to examine the 
relationship between these restraints and UFCA section 5. Does 
compliance with these statutory restraints preclude an attack on a 
distribution to shareholders under the more general rule embodied 
in UFCA section 5? Furthermore, why should distributions to 
shareholders be singled out for treatment that is different from 
that accorded all other kinds of transfers without fair considera- 
tion made by a corporate debtor? 
I would strongly argue that, when a trustee's suit under Bank- 
ruptcy Act section 67d is brought, a court can and should hold that 
the subsection's fraudulent conveyance rules preempt the dividend 
rules of state corporation laws; and that, when a state has enacted 
a fraudulent conveyance statute, it ought to be interpreted as pro- 
viding an additional set of restrictions that dividends and similar 
distributions must satisfy. There is nothing inherently problem- 
atic about barring dividends when a corporation is insolvent either 
in the equity or the UFCA sense, or when either an impairment 
of "legal capital" or an unreasonable capital for the particular 
business would afterwards obtain. Mechanical rules and flexible 
rules can co-exist, just as law and equity can. As for the statutory 
protections afforded "innocent" shareholders, they might be con- 
ceded to be preemptive, but would usually be of no avail to con- 
trolling parties. 
However, despite the paucity of case law,153 one suspects that 
as to the first question some courts would wrongly decide that the 
corporation law's rules concerning dividends preempt the rules of 
general fraudulent conveyance law.154 If this is so, one may hy- 
152 The veil-piercing cases do not appear to be a complete solution to this 
problem. Not all courts accept unadorned inadequate capitalization as a basis for 
piercing. Moreover, those that do have focused mainly on the adequacy of the 
corporation's initial capitalization, rather than on the maintenance of a capital 
cushion over time, and in any event the shareholders' personal assets may be exempt, 
inadequate, or pledged to contract creditors. 
15 Approaching the issue, but not resolving it, are: Powers v. Heggie, 268 
Mass. 233, I67 N.E. 314 (1929) (trustee in bankruptcy allowed to recover dividends 
paid when Delaware corporation insolvent; any doubt as to right to do so re- 
moved by enactment of UFCA; but Delaware corporation law not in evidence); 
and Island Paper Co. v. Carthage Timber Corp., I28 Misc. 246, 218 N.Y.S. 346 
(Sup. Ct. I926) (creditor basing action on theory of violation by dividend of 
corporate law provision not allowed to shift to fraudulent conveyance theory). 
154 The great Glenn, succumbing to the temptation to rationalize this realistic 
intuition, for once nods and makes the rather formalistic argument that the theory 
of fraudulent conveyances will not fit the case of an improper dividend because 
the stockholder is not within either of the simple categories (donee and purchaser) 
that are part of the law of fraudulent transfers, but is an investor. Otherwise, he 
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pothesize that they continue in existence for reasons other than 
the protection of creditors, since the corporate law restraints 
(other than the insolvency tests) are so obviously insignificant. 
One possible other reason is precisely that statutory restrictions on 
shareholder distributions supplant more stringent general restric- 
tions on transfers without fair consideration with a set of lax 
rules that will give management and shareholders greater freedom 
of action. Less cynically, the statutory restrictions are easily ad- 
ministrable mechanical tests that facilitate corporate planning 
and decisionmaking, whereas UFCA section 5 provides a vague 
and uncertain standard; the relevance of the standards to their 
goal and their efficacy as means have been sacrificed to manage- 
ment's desire for clarity and bright lines. This latter observation 
also provides whatever answer might be given to the second ques- 
tion.'55 Management especially wants bright lines concerning the 
chief recurrent transfers without fair consideration that a corpora- 
tion makes - dividends and other distributions to shareholders. 
The most general, and perhaps the most significant, observa- 
tion to be made about restrictions on distributions to shareholders 
is that even if they were modeled after UFCA section 5, and the 
concept of reasonable capital was given a strong content, the pro- 
simply asserts that "the law of the corporation's being" should govern. 2 G. GLENN, 
supra note i, ? 604, at I043-47. Glenn's argument is unconvincing for at least two 
reasons. First, at least under the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act, nothing in the 
language or theory of the statutes requires the fraudulent transferee or obligee to 
have the status of donee or purchaser: these are commentators' classifications for 
purposes of convenience. Second, Glenn does not explain why one set of rules 
should govern unfair dealings by controlling stockholders to the detriment of 
corporate creditors when the technique of unfairness is a dividend payment, and 
another set when the technique of unfairness is any other form of transaction, such 
as a sale of property to the corporation at an excessive price. 
Nevertheless, the argument that might persuade some courts as to the ex- 
clusivity of corporate law has been expressed: 
Where the corporation act, however, contains a provision dealing specifi- 
cally with the question of insolvency dividends, it would seem that the mere 
fact more stringent regulations existed in some general act ought not to 
affect the corporation. The legislature having dealt expressly with the 
corporate insolvency situation, general principles in other statutes ought 
not to be given effect. 
D. KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 36 (1941). Supporting Kehl's argument are pro- 
visions in corporate laws specifically stating the conditions under which stock- 
holders may be liable to corporate creditors for improper dividends received. See 
W. CARY, supra note I27, at 1573-74. Some of these provisions are clearly more 
lenient than those applicable to the ordinary fraudulent transferee or grantor, e.g., 
provisions immunizing from any duty to disgorge dividends those stockholders who 
were ignorant of the impropriety of the dividends, even when the dividends were 
paid while the corporation was insolvent. 
155 Since distributions to shareholders are the chief or only recurrent transfers 
without fair consideration that an ordinary honest corporation makes, the de- 
velopment of special, fairly definite rules about them would be understandable. 
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tection afforded creditors would still be incomplete. When a 
business corporation's capital sinks below some level that would 
provide creditors with a legally minimal protection against future 
adversities, a complete legal response would be to tell the corporate 
debtor that it must not (a) pay dividends or make other distribu- 
tions to shareholders, (b) incur additional debts unless they would 
improve ability to meet existing obligations, or (c) fail to obtain 
additional equity capital within a reasonable period of time. The 
absence of any requirement in the nature of (c), in the case of 
ordinary business corporations,156 indicates that the statutory re- 
strictions, as well as fraudulent conveyance law generally, are 
based on a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. 
Though shareholders cannot pay themselves before paying the 
company's creditors, there is no affirmative duty on their part to 
supply an additional investment to a dying corporation; such a 
duty would be in fundamental contradiction to the policy of per- 
mitting limited liability. Not even the veil-piercing cases decided 
for plaintiffs on grounds of inadequate initial capital are inclined 
to carry the affirmative duty of cooperation to the full flowering of 
a capital maintenance rule. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This essay began from two starting points: the lack of clarity 
in the case law about the purposes of fraudulent conveyance law; 
and the dearth of explicit analysis in the case law and commentary 
of the relationships among fraudulent conveyance law, equitable 
subordination doctrine, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, 
and statutory restraints on dividends. The law of fraudulent con- 
156 It is only in the case of certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, 
savings and loan associations, and insurance companies, that the law strives toward 
something like an affirmative action program with respect to capital inadequacy. 
In the regulation of commercial banks, for example, pressuring banks toward 
capital adequacy, see, e.g., Sheehan, Bank Capital Adequacy -Time To Pause and 
Reflect, Press Release of Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (November 
6, 1973) (hortatory remarks of member of Board), continues to be one of the 
most important foci of regulatory efforts, even though such efforts have sometimes 
been analyzed as failures, e.g., Peltzman, Capital Investment in Commercial Bank- 
ing and Its Relationship to Portfolio Regulation, 78 J. POL. ECON. I (I970), and 
regulatory agencies like the Federal Reserve Board have devised elaborate mechan- 
ical formulae for determining what is adequate capital, id. at 22-24. The explana- 
tion of the different legal approaches in this field is that legal protection of the 
creditors of financial intermediaries is taken much more seriously than that given 
to ordinary commercial lenders to industrial corporations because the public 
creditors of the intermediaries - basically, depositors and policyholders - are 
treated as in need of a special level of protection. This theme, however, must be 
left for treatment elsewhere. See Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 
86 YALE L.J. I (I976). 
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veyances, together with the law of voidable preferences, impli- 
cates a coherent set of conceptually distinct moral principles that 
should govern the conduct of debtors toward their creditors. 
These principles of Truth, Respect, and Evenhandedness, which 
may be grouped under the more general duty of Nonhindrance, 
are so related to one another in practice and under the standard 
"rules" of fraudulent conveyance actions that courts understand- 
ably have trouble, at times, distinguishing fraudulent conveyances 
from preferences. 
The intellectual progression from fraudulent conveyance law 
to equitable subordination and to the proposed rule of automatic 
subordination can be seen as an evolution of modes of implemen- 
tation of essentially the same ideals. The moral duties of Truth 
and Respect are specified by fraudulent conveyance law in rather 
precisely conceived tests, and their violation calls for equally 
precisely conceived, nonpunitive remedial action. Fraudulent 
conveyance law was limited in the scope of its protection by the 
concept of a transfer, and was limited by its restriction to formal 
creditors rather than extended generally to beneficiaries of a le- 
gally imposed moral relationship (such as that imposed on major- 
ity shareholders with respect to minority or preferred sharehold- 
ers). These same moral duties were given expression in a distinct, 
bankruptcy-related doctrine, that of equitable subordination, 
precisely in order to overcome the limits of fraudulent conveyance 
law. Where atomistic, transactionally-oriented proof of viola- 
tions of the moral duties would be too costly; where precisely con- 
ceived, nonpunitive remedies were felt to be infeasible; where 
violations of the duties occurred without a transfer; and where the 
duties were owed to obligees who were not legal creditors, new doc- 
trine had to be developed. The courts have found it functional not 
to characterize these developments in the doctrines of equitable 
subordination of piercing the corporate veil as an expansion or 
"weakening" of fraudulent conveyance rules. In my view, this hy- 
pothesis constitutes a plausible explanation of the failure of the 
courts deciding cases invoking these doctrines to draw the rather 
obvious parallels between what they were doing and the extensive 
case law concerning fraudulent conveyances. 
Furthermore, in some veil-piercing cases and, to a lesser de- 
gree, in some equitable subordination cases, courts have experi- 
mented with an evolution of the duties themselves, from ideals of 
Nonhindrance toward ideals of affirmative cooperation with cred- 
itors. Statutory restrictions on distributions to shareholders, by 
contrast, reflect a mechanization and weakening of the ideals. 
It is hoped that the courts will continue to develop the doc- 
trines of equitable subordination and veil-piercing, but will do 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:28:26 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
562 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:505 
so with explicit awareness of the extent to which they are being 
resorted to as a way of avoiding the requirements of fraudulent 
conveyance law. As indicated, justifications for the avoidance 
strategy may be expressed, but these justifications will not extend 
to relatively simple cases of fraudulent transfers. With respect to 
those courses of conduct of insiders that can be readily unpacked 
into untruthful or unfair transactions, the ancient leviathan of 
commercial law doctrines gives a clearer analysis and a better 
remedy. 
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